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I. INTRODUCTION
In March 1974, with little warning or fanfare, Congress passed a
major amendment' to the Federal Tort Claims Act that had the effect
of broadly reappraising government responsibility for the torts of its of-
ficials. The amendment brings within the ambit of the FTCA a group
of intentional torts previously excluded, raising once more long stand-
ing questions about the continued viability of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. But since the amendment became law with little public re-
action, its full implications have not yet been felt or assessed, and it
remains largely ignored in practice. This makes such an assessment
particularly timely and important. This article will describe the
amendment, the events that led to its enactment, and the methods by
which it should be interpreted and implemented by the bar and the
courts. Careful attention will be paid to the amendatory process, since
it is believed that through an understanding of that process the amend-
ment can serve as a spur to greater reform of the sovereign immunity
doctrine.
Part of the following discussion will be devoted to reconciling the
existing FTCA scheme with the amendment's requirements in order
to provide a roadmap to practice under the new provision. If our guess
is right, many lawyers who formerly had slight contact with the FTCA
will soon find themselves immersed in it. Therefore, we have re-
viewed some of the basic provisions of the Act in order to show how
the amendment will operate in practice.
The intentional torts amendment was passed during a period that
witnessed a remarkable series of events urgently demonstrating the need
for increased government responsibility for the tortious and unconstitu-
tional acts of its officials. From a background of the Jackson State and
Kent State tragedies in May 1970,2 the Supreme Court's decision in
1. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(h) (Supp. 1976), amending 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970).
The amendment became effective on March 16, 1974.
2. The Jackson and Kent State litigations both raised the issue of the necessity
for state governments to take responsibility for the constitutional injuries caused by their
officials. See Verkuil, Immunity or Responsibility for Unconstitutional Conduct: The
Aftermath of Jackson State and Kent State, 50 N.C.L. REv. 548 (1972). For resolu-
tions of that issue see Burton v. Waller, 502 F.2d 1261 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
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Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics'
in June 1971, the May Day mass arrests in Washington in 197 1, 4 and
the Attica debacle in September 1971,1 the focus upon responsibilities
for abuses of governmental authority is not surprising. And even today
the public is being made aware of activities by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation that have violated rights long thought to be within the
basic protections of the Constitution. 6 But the pressures that led Con-
939 (1975); Krause v. Ohio, 31 Ohio 2d 32, 285 N.E.2d 736, appeal dsmissed, 409 U.S.
1052 (1972).
3. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
4. See Apton v. Wilson, 507 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Sullivan v. Murphy, 478
F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
5. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1971, at 1, col. 2. See generally T. WcKuR, A
TIME TO Dm (1975).
6. Hearings conducted by the Senate Intelligence Committee in the fall of 1975
revealed serious abuses by the intelligence agents of the FBL Those abuses involved
violations of constitutional and common law rights of thousands of United States citi-
zens. In a statement before the Government Operations Committee, Senator Mondale,
Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee Domestic Intelligence Subcommittee,
summarized those abuses as follows:
As chairman of the Subcommittee on Domestic Intelligence of the Select
Committee, I have spent the past few months immersed in the evidence of
gross abuse of the rights of American citizens by the FBI and other domestic
intelligence agencies. The Bureau's "neutralization" of Dr. Martin Luther
King is a case in point. Between 1963 and his death in 1968, the FBI placed
Dr. King under intensive physical and electronic surveillance, including in six-
teen instances installing bugs in Dr. King's hotel rooms. The FBI decided to
use the information it had obtained through this electronic surveillance to "de-
throne" King, and to cultivate and promote a new leader of the civil rights
movement. It used the information to attempt to block Dr. King's being
awarded honorary college degrees. The Bureau attempted to block Dr. King's
audience with the Pope and to discredit him with other churches and the
clergy. It mailed a hotel "bug" tape to King with an enclosed blackmail let-
ter.
Throughout this period the FBI obtained absolutely no evidence that Dr.
King was involved in any criminal or violent activity. There was no evidence
that Dr. King was connected with the Communist Party in any way.
Yet the FBI activities directed at Dr. King were not unique. Our public
hearings in the fall documented similar activities against thousands of other do-
mestic dissidents through the FBI COINTELPRO program. We heard evi-
dence of surveillance of thousands of law abiding citizens by the FBL The
public record discloses the details of the Nixon administration's Huston plan
to coordinate intelligence activities in a concerted attempt to deprive American
citizens of their constitutional rights. We have also documented the CIA's Op-
eration CHAOS; the NSA's electronic surveillance of millions of international
telephone conversations of American citizens.
This is only a partial list but the point is obvious! Domestic intelligence
programs of the federal government have presented and if not checked will
continue to present a "clear and present danger" to the rights of speech, asso-
ciation, privacy, and the rule of law.
122 CoNG, RE . S 1808 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 1976). Neither Dr. King, his family, the vic-
tims of COINTELPRO, nor any of the other victims of federal government domestic
intelligence abuses have an effective cause of action against the federal government. Al-
though the amendment to section 2680(h) of the Federal Tort Claims Act discussed
in this article may expand government liability to a limited extent, as a general matter
those abuses that involve defamation (e.g., the King case and COINTELPRO) or sim-
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gress directly to enact the FTCA amendment did not emerge from these
events. Rather, the impetus was specifically provided by events that
occurred on the night of April 23, 1973, when federal and state narcot-
ics agents mistakenly stormed the homes of two Collinsville, Illinois,
families in an attempt to apprehend suspected cocaine dealers."
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. Collinsville
Herbert and Evelyn Giglotto awoke in their Collinsville, Illinois,
townhouse at about 9:30 p.m. on April 23, 1973, to the sound of
someone smashing down their door and bursting into their home. Mr.
Giglotto lept from bed; as he entered the hallway outside his bedroom,
he found himself confronted by perhaps five shabbily dressed men.
Brandishing pistols, they forced Giglotto back into his bedroom. They
threw him face down on his bed, tied his hands behind his back, and put
a pistol to his head. Said one, "You move, you're dead. I'm going to
shoot you.""
Evelyn Giglotto, clad only in a negligee, stood horrified as one of
the intruders screamed abuses at her incapacitated husband. Then
several turned on her, forcing her into a similar position, while others
searched the upstairs room. About fifteen men had come into the
bedroom by this time, some. entering and then leaving. Cursorily, the
men identified themselves as federal officers, flashing a badge at Mr.
Giglotto and telling him the house had been under surveillance for three
weeks. The couple, unsure what to think, could hear other men begin-
ning to ransack .the downstairs. Throughout the ordeal Giglotto, a
pistol held to his head, tried to identify himself, but the intruders refused
to respond. Some ten to fifteen minutes after the invasion began, one of
the men came into the room holding the Giglottos' bankbook and
insurance papers. "Well, we have the wrong people," he said. The
ply involve a violation of first amendment rights are not necessarily actionable under
the new amendment.
7. The incident was widely reported by local and national news media. These
reports are described herein to show the basis of congressional action, not the truth of
each allegation. See 119 CONG. Ruc. 23242 (1973). The Giglottos and the Askews
testified to details of the raids before a Senate subcommittee on May 18, 1973. Hear-
ings on Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973 Before the Subcomm. on Reorganization,
Research, and International Organizations of the Senate Comm. on Government Oper-
ations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 461, 475 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973
Hearings]. See note 220 infra.
8. 119 CONG. REc. 23246 (1973), quoting St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Apr. 29, 1973,
at 1A, col. 1.
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men, without apology, untied the couple and permitted them to sit up on
their bed. Even at this point, when Herbert Giglotto tried to put on his
pants, they were ripped from his hand. "I told you not to move." The
agents departed without explanation, leaving behind a smashed televi-
sion, a broken camera, scattered books, scratched furniture, and a shat-
tered antique vaseY
Thirty minutes later, at the nearby home of the Donald Askews, a
similar raid took place. Mr. and Mrs. Askew and their son were seated
at the kitchen table eating dinner when their dog began barking in the
living room. Mrs. Askew went to investigate and was startled to see a
man at the window. She screamed to her husband, who looked up to
find two men standing at his kitchen door-one holding a sawed-off
shotgun-and a third man standing at another door. As in the Giglotto
raid, the men were shabbily dressed, and Askew later said he thought
they were some sort of motorcycle gang. "I figured my boy had been in
a fight or something and they were going to shoot him." Askew
shouted at them to leave and tried to hold closed the kitchen door. After
a struggle the invaders flashed gold badges and insisted they were
special agents. Although bewildered, Askew unlocked the door. His
wife, who had been threatened by the man at the living room window,
fell unconscious in the bedroom. On her revival, the Askews sat down
in their living room while the agents, still holding pistols, rummaged
through the house. The agents offered little explanation for their
presence. Finally, confessing they had acted on a "bad tip," they left,
giving Donald Askew a telephone number to call.10
The agents, it became known the next day, had been under the
direction of the St. Louis office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement
(DALE),'1 a nationwide program established a year earlier on January
1, 1972, by executive order of President Richard Nixon." DALE,
which operated from thirty-eight local offices throughout the country,
had been formed to supplement the work of the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) by providing a force of attorneys and
investigators, drawn from BNDD and state and local law enforcement
units, who would mount a sustained push against heroin and cocaine
traffic. The Collinsville raids had come as part 'of an effort to stem
cocaine dealing in the eastern St. Louis area. A month-long investiga-
9. Id.
10. Id. at 23247.
11. Id.
12. Exec. Order No. 11,641, 3A C.F.R. 137 (Supp. 1972).
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tion had led to five arrests earlier on the day of the raids, 13 and later that
week BNDD arrested Robert Piker, a suspected cocaine dealer, who
gave as his address an apartment adjacent to the Giglottos'. 14
B. Administrative and Judicial Reaction
The St. Louis DALE office's initial response to the Collinsville
raids was to absorb the impact of adverse publicity with minimum
damage to its ongoing program. The office had apparently been effec-
tive its first year in apprehending drug pushers and making charges
against them stick.' 5 In its campaign, however, the fledgling DALE
reportedly was operating in unhealthy competition with BNDD and was
concerned with its own administrative survival.1 0 Thus the days imme-
diately after the Collinsville raids saw a local bureaucratic scramble to
mute the impact of the invasions. Yet as public opinion began to bear
heavily,, higher officials recognized the necessity to expose and investi-
gate what had occurred. The initial insistence that the raids had been
conducted under authority of an arrest warrant gave way to the admis-
sion that no warrant had issued; indeed, that permission to conduct the
raids had been specifically denied.17  Reports of two earlier raiding
improprieties by the St. Louis office surfaced. In one, agents searching
a house in which they eventually found heroin engaged in an alleged
"personal vendetta of wanton destruction," slashing paintings, destroy-
ing lamps and appliances, and otherwise abusing their powers of inves-
tigation.'8  That raid had brought a suit by the American Civil Liber-
ties Union.' 9
Another incident had occurred on October 17, 1972, when DALE
agents accosted Sterling Bell, Jr., a predental student at Southern Illinois
University, outside the hospital where he worked. Wearing long hair
and old clothes, one agent allegedly approached Bell, cursing and
demanding identification. He showed a badge to Bell briefly, but the
13. 119 CONG. REc. 23249 (1973), quoting St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 1, 1973,
at 9A, col. 1.
14. Id. at 23250-51, quoting St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 3, 1973, at 3A, col. 1.
15. 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 456-57; id. at 551-52 (Exhibit 51, Statement
of J. Michael Fitzsimmons, Jr., Regional Director, Region V, Office for Drug Abuse
Law Enforcement).
16. 119 CONG. REC. 23251-52 (1973), quoting St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 4,
1973; at 1A, col. 5; 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 446.
17. 119 CONG. REc. 23248-49 (1973), quoting St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Apr. 30,
1973, at 1A, col. 1.
18. Id. at 23250, quoting St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 2, 1973, at 8A, col. 1.
19. Id. at 23250, 20862, quoting The National Observer, June 23, 1973.
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student, uncertain whether the man was serious---We were standing in
front of Malcolm Bliss Mental Hospital and I thought it was some sort
of nut from there"--turned to walk away. The agent reportedly spun
him around and cocked his fist, at which point Bell hit him. The
student was then jumped by four other officers. After a struggle they
produced handcuffs; Bell claimed he realized only then that his accos-
ters were police officers.
The agents, who later admitted Bell was not the man they sought,
nevertheless processed a charge against him for assaulting a police
officer with malice and intent to maim. 0 One officer who was injured
by Bell in the struggle filed suit against him for damages. Bell, because
of legal expenses, was forced to drop out of Southern Illinois University,
and his wife reportedly became so psychologically disturbed by the
incident that she had to leave her job.21
The St. Louis Post-Dispatch soon reported that certain of the
agents involved in these earlier alleged abuses were also central figures
in the Giglotto and Askew raids.2 On May 1, after an investigation,
Myles Ambrose, the special assistant attorney general in charge of
DALE, suspended four DALE agents. He also requested that St. Louis
police officers who had been involved in the raid be taken off further
assignments in collaboration with DALE agents.2 3  Later, however,
when one of the suspended agents was discovered by the press to have
participated in a raid in Maryville, Illinois, it was revealed that Am-
brose's "suspension" consisted of a full-pay reassignment of the agents
to the St. Louis office of BNDD, where they engaged in "limited duty"
actions, including planning and coordination of further raids.2 4 This
discovery prompted further public clamor.
At the national level a memorandum deploring the actions of those
involved in the raids was circulated among the thirty-eight branches of
the agency, warning all personnel that such conduct would not be
tolerated. 25 More significantly, at the administrative level, a new agen-
cy that became DALE's successor, the Drug Enforcement Administra-
20. Id. at .23245, quoting St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Apr. 27, 1973, at 1A, col. 6.
21. Id. at 23257, quoting St. Louis Post-Dispatch, June 20, 1973, at 25A, col. 1.
22. Id. at 23250, quoting St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 2, 1973, at 1A, col. 2-3.
23. Id. at 23249, quoting St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 1, 1973, at IA, col. 2.
24. Id. at 23255-56, quoting St. Louis Post-Dispatch, June 12, 1973, at 12A, col.
6.
25. 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 550 (Exhibit 49, Memorandum from Myles
J. Ambrose, Special Assistant Attorney General, Office for Drug Abuse Law Enforce-
ment, to Regional Directors, Chief Investigators, Attorneys in Charge and All Personnel,
May 3, 1973).
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tion (DEA), issued on July 16, 1973, a new statement to all officers
concerning search and seizure policy. The statement forbade use of
"[tlhe 'no-knock' authority contained in 21 U.S.C. 879 . . . unless
specifically authorized by the Administrator or Deputy Administra-
tor."2  Further guidelines discouraged forced entry of a premises with
or without a warrant unless probable cause existed to believe a suspect
was within. Also, enforcement teams were ordered to "wear distinctive
markings, such as badges, caps, or other devices, to identify themselves
to the public and their fellow officers in all cases involving forced entry
and [to] give prior notice of authority and purpose before forcing entry
after being denied admission. '27
While these administrative changes were valuable as procedural
barriers against further abuses, they of course in no way redressed the
injuries suffered by the Askews and Giglottos. The raiding agents had
told the Askews before they left how to contact BNDD officials who
would pay them for property damage. 28  Discussions were held with
both couples soon after the raids, but the government offers of repara-
tions proved unsatisfactory.29
While the Askews' property loss consisted of a single broken door,
Mrs. Askew required hospitalization, beginning within a month of the
raid. Donald Askew claimed to have spent so much time talking to
government investigators and to his own lawyers that he was forced to
sell his service station business. He also alleged that neighbors and
business customers became unfavorably disposed toward him because of
his association with a drug raid.30 On April 25, 1973, the Askews filed
a damage suit for $100,000 in federal district court against the federal
agents involved in the raid, alleging assault, false imprisonment and
violation of civil rights.21
26. Drug Enforcement Administration, Search and Arrest: A Statement of Policy,
reprinted in 119 CONG. Rnc. 24284-85 (1973).
27. Id. at 24285.
28. According to Herbert Giglotto, two federal employees came to his home to
appraise damages the day after the raid. They apparently promised to pay for property
damages. Accounts suggest Askew was given similar information on the evening of the
raid. Id. at 23246-47, quoting St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Apr. 29, 1973, at 27A, col. 3.
29. As Herbert Giglotto told a St. Louis Post-Dispatch reporter: "Yes, they sent
two young men out the next day to take an appraisal for what damages they did. They
were very polite. And that's when it started getting to me. . . . I don't think the im-
pact of what they did to our lives . . . all they were interested in was how much to
replace the bookcase, and how much does it cost to repair the television." Id. at 23246,
quoting St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Apr. 29, 1973, at 27A, col. 1.
30. Id. at 23246-47, 23242-43, quoting St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Apr. 29, 1973, at
27A, col. 3; N.Y. Times, July 4, 1973, at 38, col. 1.
31. Id, at 23243-44,
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The Giglottos maintained that they were the victims of repeated dis-
turbances subsequent to the raid-that FBI investigators visited their
neighbors trying to uncover damaging information about them, that they
received threatening midnight phone calls promising "revenge," that
both their cars were sideswiped. Finally, on July 3, saying "[w]e just
can't take the harassment any more," the family fled Collinsville for an
undisclosed new home.3 2 The Giglottos also filed a damage action,
seeking one million dollars.33
A Madison County, Illinois, grand jury was convened on May 3,
1973, to consider possible state criminal violations by the federal
agents.14 A federal grand jury began investigation on May 7.35 After
several weeks of inquiry both the Civil Rights Division of the Justice
Department and the FBI were brought in to supplement the federal
grand jury's work. 6  At this time, the investigation was broadened to
include the Giglottos' charges of BNDD harassment after the raid as
well as the Sterling Bell incident. This flurry of activity did not elim-
inate certain potential conflicts of interest, however. The BNDD, the
FBI and the Civil Rights Division are all agencies of the Justice Depart-
ment. More seriously, the same federal grand jury that was eventually
asked to consider possible action against the DALE agents had, only
a week earlier, returned indictments against alleged drug dealers after
hearing testimony from those same agents. 7
C. Congressional Reaction
(1) Investigation
The Collinsville raids came at a time when several United States
Senators had been working in areas related to those events. Senator
Charles Percy of Illinois had scheduled subcommittee hearings in Illi-
nois for May 18, 1973, on a proposal to meld BNDD and DALE into
one superagency, the Drug Enforcement Administration." Later Per-
32. Id. at 23242-43, quoting N.Y. Times, July 4, 1973, at 38, col. 1.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 23251-52, quoting St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 4, 1973, at 1A, col. 7.
35. Id. at 23252, quoting St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 7, 1973, at 11A, col. 4.
36. Id. at 23257, quoting St. Louis Post-Dispatch, June 20, 1973, at 1A, col. 4.
37. Id. at 23253, quoting St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 13, 1973, at 3A, col. 1.
38. The Drug Enforcement Administration was finally established by the Reor-
ganization Plan No. 2 of 1973, effective July 1, 1973, as amended March 16, 1974. Pub.
L No. 93-253, § 1, 88 Stat. SG (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 509 (&ipp. 1975)). For an
account of the development and principal features of the plan, designed to place primary
responsibility for federal drug law enforcement on DEA, see S. REP. No. 469, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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cy, expressing shock at the tactics used by the Collinsville agents, invited
both the Giglottos and the Askews to testify at the hearings.so He
stressed the need for reorganization of the narcotics agencies, suggesting
that "bureaucratic infighting' might have been behind the raids. At the
hearings Percy also struck out against the no-knock authority given drug
agents by 21 U.S.C. § 879.40
Another Senator who responded to the raids by blasting "no-
knock" authority was Sam Ervin of North Carolina. In a speech before
the Senate on May 10, 1973, Ervin, long a critic of "no-knock"
searches, cited two incidents in Massachusetts and the Collinsville raids
to support his contention that the "no-knock" authority granted by 21
U.S.C. § 879 was a "giant step in conversion of our free society into a
police state."4' 1 Ervin acknowledged that the Collinsville tactics--the
entrance without any warrant---exceeded even no-knock boundaries,
but implied that the law itself had encouraged such unlawful abuses.
Ervin promised that unless he received satisfactory explanation of the
incident from DALE's Myles Ambrose, he would "introduce legislation
repealing or modifying the Justice Department's authority to conduct
no-knock searches."4
Coincident with these public utterances, both Senators initiated
correspondence and discussions, attempting to ferret out details of the
raids and the broader contours of search and seizure methods employed
by the drug agencies.4 3 From this inquiry the Senators recognized that
even repeal of the "no-knock" law would do nothing to recompense
39. 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 446.
40. Id. at 474. 21 U.S.C. § 879(b) "(1970) reads:
Any officer authorized to execute a search warrant relating to offenses involv-
ing controlled substances the penalty for which is imprisonment for more than
one year may, without notice of his authority and purpose, break open an outer
or inner door or window of a building, or any part of the building, or anything
therein, if the judge or United States Magistrate issuing the warrant (1) is sat-
isfied that there is probable cause to believe that (A) the property sought may
and, if such notice is given, will be easily and quickly destroyed or disposed
of,-or (B) the giving of such notice will immediately endanger the life or safety
of the executing officer or another person, and (2) has included in the warrant
a direction that the officer executing it shall not be required to give such no-
tice. Any officer acting under such warrant, shall, as soon as practicable after
entering the premises, identify himself and give the reasons and authority for
his entrance upon the premises.
41. 119 CoNe. REc. 15170 (1973). Senator Ervin reemphasized these points on
May 13, 1973, in an address at Chapel Hill to the graduates of the University of North
Carolina School of Law.
42 Id. at 15171.
43. Letter from Sam J. Ervin, Jr. to Myles J. Ambrose, May 7, 1973, copy on file
in the University of North Carolina Law Library; 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 548-50
(Exhibit 48, Letter from Charles H. Percy to Myles J. Ambrose, April 30, 1973).
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financially the victims of abuse by federal officers. Several sources
Ervin contacted, including John Laughlin, Chief of the Torts Section of
the Civil Division of the Department of Justice, pointed out that the
sovereign immunity bar, which precluded successful civil suits against
the federal government for otherwise tortious activity, would limit the
Giglottos and the Askews to suits for compensation against individual
federal officers.44
Ervin learned, however, that the Justice Department had recently
prepared legislation to alter this responsibility by accepting federal
liability for tortious acts, in exchange for legal immunity for officers in
their individual capacities. The proposed vehicle for the Justice Depart-
ment-sponsored change was an amendment of the Federal Tort Claims
Act.45 At that point Senators Ervin and Percy began to explore their
own amendment to the FTCA.
(2) The Existing Legal Framework
The legal idiosyncrasies of "sovereign immunity," the general term
for the issue around which proposals and counterproposals developed
during the next several months, proved so complex that the parties
involved, because of political exigencies, were unable to deal adequately
with the manifold problems raised by their proposals. It would be
helpful at this juncture, before continuing with a description of the
development of the new legislation, to sketch briefly the principal laws,
doctrines and cases which littered the field and with which the drafters
had to struggle.46
Sovereign immunity was an English doctrine traditionally said to
be rooted in the idea that "the king could do no wrong." It precluded
suit directly against the crown, although modem scholarship has demon-
strated that many devices were quite regularly employed to circumvent
44. Memorandum from Mark Gitenstein and Harvey Stuart, Staff Counsel, Consti-
tutional Rights Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, to Bob
Smith, Chief Counsel, Senate Committee on Government Operations, at 3, copy on file
in the University of North Carolina Law Library.
45. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401-02, 2411-12, 2671-80 (1970).
46. For accounts and analyses of governmental immunity in the United States see
generally Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort: VII, 28 CoL1JM. 1. REv. 577,
734 (1928); Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE LJ. 1, 757, 1039
(1926-27); Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-
25); Davis, Tort Liability of Governmental Units, 40 MINN. L. RPv. 751 (1956);
Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HIv. L. Rv.
1 (1963); James, Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. Cm.
L. Rnv. 610 (1955).
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the injustice and unworkability of such a doctrine strictly construed.47
For various reasons, the American colonies, after fighting to overthrow
English monarchy, did not reject sovereign immunity, however incon-
sistent such a course seemed with republican philosophy. Some have
suggested that this survival in seemingly alien political soil had to do
with the economic precariousness of the new union, but it is likely that
some properly limited variant of the doctrine is a necessary aspect of
government.4" Chief Justice John Marshall specifically embraced the
idea in Cohens v. Virginia,49 a case in which the Supreme Court held
that the United States was immune from suit unless it had given its con-
sent to the action.5" The susceptibility of the states to suits by United
States citizens also was the subject of a celebrated early case, Chisholm
v. Georgia,"' in which the Supreme Court found the state of Georgia
subject to suit by a citizen of South Carolina.5 2 Principally in reaction
to Chisholm, the eleventh amendment was ratified to limit state liabil-
ity.53 In 1855, by passage of the Court of Claims Act, the federal gov-
ernment began to acknowledge that an absolute bar against suit was
impractical." Later, in 1887, the Tucker Act"5 was passed to expand
jurisdiction over contractual issues. However, until 1946, most private
grievances outside the contractual area were answered-if at all-only
by the passage of private bills through Congress.56 In 1946, the fed-
eral government broadened its own liability considerably by passage of
the Federal Tort Claims Act,57 which permitted recovery against the
47. Jaffe, supra note 46, at 1-19.
48. See notes 167-70 infra.
49. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
50. Id. at 411-12.
51. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. XI reads: "The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." While the amendment speaks only of suits by citizens of another state
or of foreign states, the Supreme Court subsequently extended the exclusion to include
suits by a state's own citizens in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
53. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, § 1, 10 Stat. 612 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 171-
74 (1970)). Initially the act established the court only as an advisory body to Con-
gress, which had power of approval over the court's recommendations. By Act of March
3, 1863, ch. 92, § 7, 12 Stat. 766, Congress gave the court the right to render final judg-
ments (now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2519 (1970)).
54. Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 359, § 1, 24 Stat. 505 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§
1346(a), 1491 (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972)).
55. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (codified in scattered sections of
28 U.S.C.).
56. See generally Holtzoff, The Handling of Tort Claims Against the Federal Gov-
ernment, 9 LAw & CONTE?". PROB. 311 (1942); Note, Tort Claims Against the United
States, 30 Gao. L.J. 462 (1942).
57. Act of Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, tit. IV, 60 Stat. 842. An analytical account of
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government for the negligent acts of its employees.58 Certain subse-
quent congressional acts abrogating immunity defenses have created
other pockets of exceptions to the general rule of federal nonliability."9
It is important in this brief review to distinguish between the
federal government's liability for the acts of its employees and employ-
ees' individual liability for the same acts. While federal "entity" liability
developed pursuant to the doctrines and statutes sketched above, indi-
vidual liability was generally determined under state statutory and
common law.s0 Thus, while the federal treasury could not be tapped
for an illegal invasion of a citizen's privacy, the federal officer or
employee involved could lose his private fortune if state law permitted.
Federal laws were enacted in the post-Civil War period that allowed
a federal recovery against state officials who exceeded their authority.
The rediscovery since the 1950's of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,61 for
example, has provided a meaningful federal remedy for a wide range of
opprobrious action by state officials, but the concurrent growth of an
individual immunity doctrine has clouded the ultimate effectiveness of
that remedy. 62
the enactment of the FrCA may be found in 1 L. JAYSON, HANDLLNG FEDERAL TORT
CLAmS: AnSms'RATrIVE & JuDIcIAL REMEDIES § 60 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
JAYSON]. For a bibliography on the FTCA see Gantt, Indexed Bibltography of the
Federal Tort Claims Act (pt. 2), 24 FED. B.J. 226 (1964); Gerwig & Gantt, Indexed
Bibliography to the Federal Tort Claims Act-1965-1969, 29 FED. BJ. 129 (1969-70).
58. Actually, the scope of the FTCA is somewhat broader than negligent torts-
it permits suits for the intentional torts of trespass and invasion of privacy. See notes
98-99 and accompanying text infra.
59. For a comprehensive treatment of all compensatory remedies available under
statute to litigants against the federal government, see JAYSON, supra note 56, §§ 1-21.
60. It is also important at the state law level to distinguish state governmental lia-
bility from municipal liability, and the liability of various governmental 'entities from
that of state or local officers and employees. For an example of the bewildering com-
plexity of state governmental tort law, one need look no further than to Illinois, the state
in which the Giglottos and Askews resided. Recent Illinois experience with sovereign
immunity issues is detailed in Kionka, The King is Dead, Long Live the King: State
Sovereign Immunity in Illinois, 59 ILL. B.J. 660 (1971); Comment, Illinois Tort Claims
Act: A New Approach to Municipal Tort Immunity in Illinois, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 265
(1966); Note, Torts-Local Governmental And Governmental Employees Tort Immu-
nity Act, 49 CH.-KENT L. REv. 221 (1972).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). E.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
62. In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), the Supreme Court declared that a
judge sued under section 1983 had absolute immunity for judicial acts under well-
established principles. Id. at 553-54. Furthermore, federal defenses of "good faith" and
"probable cause" were declared available to law enforcement officials accused of prose-
cuting defendants illegally. Id. at 555-57. Recently, the Supreme Court has held that
a section 1983 damage action against the Governor of Ohio and officers and members of
its National Guard was not barred by any sovereign immunity principles lurking in the
eleventh amendment, but that those defendants were entitled to immunity defenses that
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The irony of section 1983 was that federal law provided an ag-
grieved plaintiff a recovery against illegal actions by state officials even
as it neglected federal relief for misdeeds of federal officials. A break-
through in developing a federal remedy against individual federal em-
ployees came in 1971, not through legislative actionA but from the
Supreme Court, in the case of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents."3
In that case Mr. Justice Brennan accepted the argument that a cause of
action for damages against federal officers could rest on the fourth
amendment of the Constitution." Although Bivens did not spell out
the nature and number of such "constitutional" torts, subsequent lower
court cases have extended its logic to other types of constitutional
injury."5
(3) Legislative Proposals and Counterproposals
The specter of broad Bivens liability, as well as the activities of
Senators Ervin and Percy, seemed clearly to have been a major motive
behind the Justice Department's willingness in 1973 to propose new
legislation broadening federal governmental liability under the FTCA.
The decision was reached that the federal government should absorb the
impact of suits that might otherwise financially devastate individual
federal law enforcement officers. The Justice Department proposal had
four principal features. First, it was to have created a new federal cause
of action "where the claims for money damages sounding in tort arise
under the Constitution or statutes of the United States, such liability to
be determined in accordance with applicable federal law.""" The De-
partment's reference to torts arising "under the Constitution" was clearly
an invitation for the federal courts to expand their "constitutional tort"
theory, substituting (or at least supplementing) federal employee liabili-
ty with federal governmental liability for constitutional torts. By this
language, the Justice Department drafters apparently meant to refer to
and create a federal statutory claim equivalent to those torts that had
became more generous as their responsibilities increased. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232 (1974). See also Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
63. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
64. Id. at 389.
65. See Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975) (Bivens extended to dam-
age claims under the first amendment); Farber v. Rizzo, 363 F. Supp. 386, 398 (E.D.
Pa. 1973) (first amendment); Johnston v. National Broadcasting Co., 356 F. Supp. 904
(E.D.N.Y. 1973) (sixth amendment).
66. Undated draft of a Department of Justice bill, copy on file in the University
of North Carolina Law Library [hereinafter cited as Justice Draft].
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been judicially recognized in Bivens,67 with the explicit intention that
"the case law in federal actions following Bivens will become the
applicable law."68 The drafters were following Justice Harlan's conclu-
sion in Bivens that a uniform body of federal law was highly preferable
to variegated liability under fifty different state laws.6 9
However, the Department's proposal to create a federal cause of
action "when the claims... arise under ... statutes of the United States"
was somewhat more ambiguous. A reasonable interpretation would
have been that the Department merely meant by "statutes" to refer to
the FTCA itself (or to other statutes explicitly permitting suit against
the government)7" and that such intent was manifested in the phrase
qualifying the "statutes" language, which read: "such liability to be
determined in accordance with applicable Federal law."71
67. Letter from Mike McKevitt of the Department of Justice to Robert B. Smith,
General Counsel, Senate Committee on Government Operations, Sep. 27, 1975, at 1,
copy on file in the University of North Carolina Law Library Ihereinafter cited as
McKevitt Letter].
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1-2. See 403 U.S. at 409 (concurring opinion).
70. In a conversation on August 30, 1973 with H. McLean Redwine, Legislative
Attorney of the Justice Department, Mark Gitenstein directly raised the issue of the
scope of the term "statutes." Neither party seemed to have considered a reading limited
to the FTCA or other statutes waiving sovereign immunity. In a next-day recapitulation
of the major points of their conversation, Gitenstein wrote: "Would the word 'statute'
contained in sections 1 and 2 be interpreted to include Federal regulations? If that were
the case, an agent who violated regulations promulgated by a Federal agency would also
subject the Federal Government to liability, which would be an excellent added deterrent
to irresponsible activity by Federal law enforcement agents." Letter from Mark Giten-
stein to H. McLean Redwine, Legislative Attorney, Department of Justice, Aug. 31,
1973, at 2, copy on file in the University of North Carolina Law Library [hereinafter
cited as Gitenstein Letter]. The Justice Department eventually responded to the query by
stating, "[w]e doubt that the word 'statute' contained in Sections 1 and 2 would (or
should) be interpreted to include Federal regulations, and we have serious misgivings
as to whether the word 'regulation' should be added to the proposal." McKevitt Letter,
supra note 67, at 4.
71. The effect of the qualifying language "in accordance with applicable Federal
law" also received attention: "[W]hat is the meaning of the phrase 'such liability
to be determined in accordance with applicable Federal law' found in sections 1 and 2
of the proposal? Would that language refer a court to the Bivens case, and to case law
under 42 U.S.C. 1983? How does this phrase relate to earlier language in 28 U.S.C.
1346(b) suggesting that liability is to be determined by the law of the place of the tort?"
Gitenstein Letter, supra note 70, at 1. In response to this query by Gitenstein the Jus-
tice Department stated in a followup letter:
Traditional ordinary types of tort actions will continue to be determined by
state law. Actions sounding in tort which arise under the Constitution or stat-
utes of the United States were judicially recognized as valid causes of action
in Bivens ....
This remedy was fashioned by the Supreme Court to provide relief in sit-
uations not provided for by state law. The proposed statutory language was
selected for the reason that there is no such state law and the case law in fed-
eral actions following Bivens will become the applicable law.
McKevitt Letter, supra note 67, at 1.
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It appeared that the Justice Department read Bivens as recognizing
tort claims not only from constitutional violations by government
authorities but from statutory violations as well. This notion that a
remedy in tort automatically had become available whenever the govern-
ment violated its own statutes was thoroughly novel. The idea was not
explicit in Bivens, and the significance of such a profoundly far-
reaching proposal seems not to have been completely grasped by the
federal drafters. Nevertheless, recognition of such liability was one
intended feature of the Justice proposal, and it remains important
today.7
A second feature, and perhaps the principal motivating factor, was
to have been a substitution of governmental liability for individual em-
ployee liability. To this end the proposed bill made the governmental
remedy exclusive.7 3 The Department was able to advance several rea-
sons for the proposed limitation, including improvement of federal em-
ployee morale, increase of governmental effectiveness by freeing em-
ployees from worry about personal liability, provision of a more appro-
priate means of employee "discipline," and elimination of the possibil-
ity of conflict of interest caused by the Justice Department's long-
standing tradition of defending suits against federal employees.74
In advocating this shift to exclusive governmental liability, the
Department also pointed to section 2679 of the FTCA, which makes
recovery against the government the exclusive remedy for damages
resulting from negligent operation by federal employees of motor vehi-
cles. 75  The Justice Department argued that such special treatment for
certain employee acts was unfair, and that a uniform provision covering
all federal acts would be more equitable. Of course, the counter-
argument was that the agents were acting intentionally and should not
be immunized from liability. The only effective deterrent to such ac-
tivity might be individual agent liability.
72. See notes 98-101 and accompanying text infrd.
73. Sec. 4. Section 2679(b) of title 28, United States Code, is amended to read as
follows:
(b) The remedy against the United States provided by sections 1346(b) and
2672 of this title for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his employment is exclusive of
any other civil action or proceeding arising out of or relating to the same sub-ject matter against the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim,
or against the estate of such employee.
Justice Draft, supra note 66.
74. McKevitt Letter, supra note 67, at 4-6.
75. Id. at 4-5. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2679(b)-(d) (1970).
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A third feature was to have been a restriction of liability to "actual
damages" and "where appropriate, reasonable compensation for general
damages not to exceed $5,000." The absence of a provision for
punitive damages76 and the limitation on general damages could be
troublesome in circumstances involving constitutional torts or invasion
of privacy, in which damages are not easily objectified.
The final principal feature of the Justice Department proposal was,
in some respects, the most startling. It was to abolish immunity, not
merely for the acts of Justice Department or law enforcement personnel,
but for tortious acts of all federal governmental employees. 7 This most
salutary feature of the Justice proposal was ultimately narrowed to
coverage of federal investigative and law enforcement officers." s
The two Senate committees most concerned with broadening feder-
al liability-the Government Operations Committee and the Subcom-
mittee on Constitutional Rights-prepared several counterproposals.
76. The pertinent section of the draft bill reads as follows:
Section 2674 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by deleting the first
paragraph and substituting the following:
"The United States shall be liable in accordance with the provisions of
section 1346(b) of this title, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judg-
ment or for punitive damages: Provided, That for claims arising under the
Constitution or statutes of the United States, recovery shall be restricted to ac-
tual damages and, where appropriate, reasonable compensation for general
damages not to exceed $5,000."
Justice Draft, supra note 66, § 3. The exclusion of punitive damages would have been
consistent with prior FTCA law, which does not permit punitive recovery. See text ac-
companying notes 189-91 infra.
In clarifying the use of its terms, the Justice Department wrote:
General damages are those damages actually incurred but which are incapable
of specific ascertainment or measurement. Special damage includes items such
as medical bills, lost income, property damage, etc. General, as opposed to
special damages, include damages for intangible items such as hurt feelings,
mental anguish, pain, suffering, humiliation, etc.
We have limited general damages to no more than $5,000 as a means
of defining "reasonable" in terms of reasonable general damages. It must be
borne in mind that an aggrieved person will receive his full out of pocket loss
without any general damage award. ... We feel that a dollar limit for gen-
eral damages is appropriate so that courts will not begin to assess punitive dam-
ages under the guise of compensating a plaintiff. There is some room for dif-
ference on what constitutes a reasonable sum.
McKevitt Letter, supra note 67, at 2.
77. The Justice Department proposed to modify 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) to read as
follows: "Any claims arising out of libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit or interfer-
ence with contract rights." Justice Draft, supra note 66, § 5. Since section 2680(h)
details certain exclusions from the FTCA, only the torts named in the draft section
would have continued to be immune from suit.
78. White House officials negotiating on the amendment to H.R. 8245 refused to
accept an amendment to section 2680 that would encompass all federal employees. In-
deed, Administration support of many features of the comprehensive Justice Department
proposal was less than enthusiastic.
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One version, which included direct repeal of the no-knock laws " for
drug agents, did not meet with favor and was abandoned. s0 Instead,
the committee staffs turned to the issue on which there was apparent
Administration willingness to move and which, after all, they had
identified as the most disgraceful aspect of the Collinsville raids-the
inadequate federal liability for tortious abuses.
The committee drafts' that received serious attention, while adopt-
ing the new cause of action as drafted by the Justice Department,
differed from the Justice Department proposal in two major respects.
First, it suggested permitting "all actual, general and consequential
damages and, where appropriate, reasonable compensation for punitive
or exemplary damages not to exceed $50,000. "82 Secondly, it did not
make the governmental remedy exclusive; instead, by omitting any
exclusivity provision, it permitted a plaintiff to sue both the government
and its employee. The committee draft did accept the Justice Depart-
ment's understanding of the sources of the new cause of action, how-
ever. The Senate memorandum articulated its understanding of the
measure in the following terms:
This section further states that liability of the government is to be
determined by "applicable federal law." By this it is intended that
the courts look to the Bivens case, and the cases that have arisen
as a result of that decision; that the courts look to the case law
79. Repeal of the no knock statute was finally enacted. Pub. L. No. 93-481, -,
88 Stat. 1455, repealing 21 U.S.C. § 879(b) (1970).
80. Undated draft, entitled "A Bill to protect the constitutional and common law
rights of citizens who are the victims of tortious acts or omissions by agents or employ-
ees of the Federal Government, and for other purposes," copy on file in the University
of North Carolina Law Library.
81. Undated draft bill of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, en-
titled 'To Amend Reorganization Plan Numbered 2 of 1973," copy on file in the Uni-
versity of North Carolina Law Library [hereinafter cited as Senate Draft].
82. Id. § 5. In a memorandum clarifying its proposal, the Senate Committee ob-
served:
This provision is designed to provide complete compensation for all out-of-
pocket expenses and all possible related or consequential damages including
pain, suffering and humiliation. Of course, in many cases where a federal
agent violates the constitutional rights of a citizen via an illegal search there
are no out-of-pocket expenses or actual damages to the victim but only severe
humiliation. This provision is designed to make it clear that the victim is en-
titled to complete compensation for that humiliation, pain and suffering even
if there are no actual damages.
Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations, Memorandum on No-Knock Legislation, Aug. 28,
1973, at 4, copy on file in the University of North Carolina Law Library [hereinafter
cited as Senate Memorandum]. It is questionable whether this view accurately stated
the law relating to damages for "humiliation." As Professor Dobbs has made clear,
what we are talking about in these cases is general damages for a dignitary injury which
may be more than nominal even though there is no economic or physical injury. D.
DOBBs, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW oF REMEDIES § 7.1, at 509-10 (1973).
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under section 1983 . . . in which state agents are held liable for
their unconstitutional acts; and that courts look to the relevant
case law under the FTCA. In referring the courts to the case law
under section 1983 it is intended that the federal government be
liable to the same extent and in the same manner as state officials
under section 1983.83
This statement indicated that, like the Justice Department, the Senate
committees were attacking the problem almost exclusively from the
perspective of Bivens and section 1983, without realizing that the
Bivens analysis had itself been necessary only because no statute had
been passed to give the courts power to award damages to an injured
individual for government misdeeds.
On one point, however, the Senate committees were clearly insis-
tent on distinguishing their recommendation from prior law. The
federal government was not to be allowed to escape liability under the
new statute by retreating behind various "defenses" that had been
created under Bivens8 4 or section 1983. 85 Thus the Senate memoran-
dum declared:
It is not the intention of this amendment to allow any other defenses
[besides those in section 2680(h)] that may be available to indi-
vidual defendants by state or federal law, custom or practice to be
asserted [by] the government. Congress does not oppose, however,
the assertion of defenses of good faith and reasonable belief in the
validity of the search and arrest on behalf of individual government
defendants, so long as it is understood that the government's lia-
bility is not co-terminous with that of the individual defendants. 86
Thus, despite the constant reference in legislative documents to Bivens
and section 1983, the proposed federal liability was meant to differ in
this very crucial aspect from its historical analogues.
In the main, both the legislative committees and the Justice Depart-
ment failed fully to grasp that by drafting a comprehensive bill to define
federal intentional tort liability they could have obviated any necessity to
83. Senate Memorandum, supra note 82, at 3. The temptation to equate Bivens
recoveries with section 1983 appears irresistible and the courts are beginning to do so
with increasing frequency. See, e.g., Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862 (3rd Cir. 1975).
84. Under Bivens theory, as expounded by the Second Circuit on remand from the
Supreme Court, a law enforcement officer could defend against liability by asserting the
good faith of his action and the reasonable belief in the validity and necessity of the
arrest and search. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir.
1972).
85. Section 1983 has been interpreted to contain a broad defense of good faith.
See note 62 and accompanying text supra.
86. Senate Memorandum, supra note 82, at 5.
1976]. 515
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
rely on analogies to Bivens' "constitutional tort" theory or on section
1983 case law that had developed largely as a result of statutory inade-
quacies. Furthermore, the narrow parameters of the legislative ac-
tivity, restricted to an amendment to section 2680(h), meant that the
drafters did not direct attention to the peculiar idiosyncrasies of the
Federal Tort Claims Act.87  Therefore, the drafters ignored certain
basic problems in using the FTCA as a vehicle for their intended pur-
pose. Instead, all attention seemed directed at achieving a compromise
between administrative and legislative positions based on a preoccupa-
tion with the Bivens and section 1983 background.
(4) Passage
The Justice Department proposal was submitted to the Vice Presi-
dent, as President of the Senate, by the Attorney General on September
17, 1973.8 The bill was subsequently introduced as Senate Bill No.
2558 by Senator Roman Hruska on October 10, 1973, and referred to
the Committee on the Judiciary." Senator Ervin decided to exert
legislative pressure for his own version by appending it to House of
Representatives Bill No. 8245, a bill pending in the Senate Committee
on Government Operations."0 Since that bill made significant changes
in the organization of the federal drug control apparatus, it had some
ostensible connection with the changes Ervin sought in the FTCA.
However, the more pertinent reason for employing H.R. 8245 was
Ervin's knowledge that the Administration and other interested par-
ties9 wanted the bill passed quickly. In subsequent negotiations, there-
fore, the Administration agreed to drop its restriction of recovery to
87. See text following note 110 infra.
88. Letter from Attorney General Elliot Richardson to Vice President Spiro Ag-
new, Sept. 17, 1973, together with the revised Justice Department Draft, entitled "A Bill
to amend title 28 of the United States Code, to provide for an exclusive remedy against
the United States in suits based upon acts or omission [sic] of United States employees
and for other purposes," copies on file in the University of North Carolina Law Library.
89. 119 CONG. REc. 33494 (1973).
90. The original intent of H.R. 8245 is detailed in H.R. REP. No. 303, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 3-6 (1973). The purpose of H.R. 8245 was twofold: (1) to establish the Drug
Enforcement Agency as a successor to BNDD and DALE; (2) to repeal a transfer of
900 agents from the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Justice Department
to the Customs Bureau in the Treasury Department. Id. at 1.
91. On November 6, 1973, Ervin received a letter from Congressman Chet
Holifield, Chairman of the House Committee on Government Operations, request-
ing quick action on H.R. 8245 because of Immigration and Naturalization Service
pressure. Holifield alluded to the "non-germane" amendments which Ervin's committee
was considering and asked that they be dealt with separately. Letter from Chet Holi-
field to Honorable Sam I. Ervin, Chairman, Committee on Government Operations,
Nov. 1, 1973, copy on file in the University of North Carolina Law Library.
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"actual damages" plus $5,000 in "general damages." In exchange, the
legislative committees gave up a litigant's right to sue both the federal
government and the individual malefactor.92 Also, inexplicable except
as a result of preoccupation with Collinsville, the Senate committees
permitted liability to be restricted to "acts or omissions of investigative
or law enforcement officers." Other federal employees and officers
were excluded from coverage, though the initial Justice Department
position had offered the possibility of suit against any federal employee.
On November 28, the Administration, in a letter from the Execu-
tive Office of the President, agreed "not to object" to the addition of the
Senate Committee's amendment to H.R. 8245.93 The next day, the
bill was reported out to the full Senate, voted upon, and returned to
the House on December 4, 1973, as amended.94 Although some fur-
ther delay ensued, the bill as amended finally passed in the House
on March 5, 1974-though not without strenuous dissent 95-and be-
came law on March 16, 1974.98
III. ,Tim AMENDMENT
A. Basic Features
The text of the new amendment is quite brief. It supplements 28
U.S.C. § 2680(h) as follows:
The provisions of this chapter and 1346(b) of this title
shall not apply to--(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery,
false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of
process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference
with contract rights: Provided, That, with regard to acts or omis-
sions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United
States Government, the provision of this chapter and section 1346
(b) of this title shall apply to any claim arising, on or after the
enactment of this proviso, out of assault, battery, false imprison-
ment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution. For
the purpose of this subsection, 'investigative or law enforcement
92. Letter from Frederic V. Malek, Deputy Director, Office of Management and
Budget, to Sam Ervin, Nov. 28, 1973, copy on file in the University of North Carolina
Law Library.
93. S. REP. No. 588, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1973).
94. 119 CONG. REc. 38559, 39309 (1973).
95. Representative Wiggins was particularly concerned about lack of House debate
on the amendment. He opposed the amendment unless its passage was connected to
careful congressional investigation of the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule. See
120 CONG. Rnc. H 1398-1402 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1974). See text accompanying notes
198-205 intra.
96. 120 CONG. Rc. H 2383 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1974).
19763
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
officer' means any officer of the United States who is empowered
by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests
for violations of Federal law.97
Since section 2680(h) establishes exclusions from FTCA coverage, the
amendment, by excepting suits against law enforcement officers from
the operation of the section, permits such suits.
Cursory reading of section 2680(h) probably accounts for the
frequent statement that the FTCA excludes "intentional" torts from
coverage. Actually, the list beginning "assault, battery . . . " omits
mention of a number of intentional torts, most notably trespass and
invasion of privacy, that have never been excluded from FTCA cover-
age. Successful suits have been brought against the federal government
for trespass,98 and it is likely that the willingness of DALE officials to
settle with the Giglottos and Askews99 reflected recognition that trespass
claims .might well have been successful. The amendment's failure to
refer to trespass and invasion of privacy therefore does not reflect a
legislative disinclination to permit suits on such causes of action; rather,
such suits were possible prior to the amendment. In fact, the report
of the Committee on Government Operations of the Senate explicitly
states:
The Committee realizes that under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, Government tort liability for intentional conduct is unclear.
For example certain intentional torts such as trespass and invasion
of privacy are not always excluded from Federal Tort Claims Act
coverage. Obviously, it is the intent of the Committee that these
borderline cases under the present law, such as trespass and inva-
sion of privacy, would be viewed as clearly within the scope of the
Federal Tort Claims Act . .. . o
It is clear, however, that the amendment does not permit suit on all
intentional torts previously excluded from FTCA coverage. Libel,
97. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(h) (Supp. 1976) (emphasis added), amending 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(h) (1970).
98. See, e.g., Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173 (1956); Black v. United
States, 389 F. Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1975); Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States,
276 F. Supp. 518 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), affl'd, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968). See generally
Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 574 (1952). In addition, federal courts have permitted recovery
to plaintiffs assaulted or battered by third parties when the government's negligence has
been alleged to have permitted the assaults. Gibson v. -United States, 457 F.2d 1391
(3d Cir. 1972); Rogers v. United States, 397 F.2d 12, 15 (4th Cir. 1968); Muniz v.
United States, 305 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1962) en banc, afl'd, 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
Assaults and batteries arising out of negligence by employees of the Public Health Serv-
ice in the performance of medical, surgical or dental procedures can properly be the
subjects of claims under 42 U.S.C. § 233(e) (1970).
99. See notes 28-29 supra.
100. S. R P. No. 588, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973).
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slander, misrepresentation, deceit and interference with contractual
rights were omitted from the language of the amendment and continue
to be "protected" governmental activities. 101
The amendment carefully limits its effect to "investigative or law
enforcement officers of the United States government"--a term that is
defined to mean "any officer of the United States who is empowered by
law to execute searches, to seize evidence or to make arrests for viola-
tions of Federal law." Well-established constitutional, 10 2 statutory 0 3
and case law 04 distinctions between federal "officers" and federal "em-
ployees" seem invoked by the amendment's definition, although that was
apparently not the intent of the drafters. Nevertheless, the amendment
seems likely to be interpreted to preclude suit against either federal
employees0 5 or federal officers without the statutory power to search,
seize evidence, or make arrests. This patchwork coverage may there-
fore prove an occasional refuge against liability, necessitating a check
of federal statutes to ascertain whether those who violated a citizen's
rights fall within the limitations of this clause. While the definition
should reach those federal officials who are most likely to commit inten-
tional torts, the restrictions may prove unfortunate in certain circum-
stances. For example, if those at Collinsville who committed tortious
acts were federal "employees,"' 0 6 liability under the FTCA would in
all likelihood be precluded.
On the other hand, whole areas of potential liability, not contem-
plated by those who drafted with Collinsville in mind, are created by the
amendment. The warden of a federal penitentiary is appointed by the
101. See, e.g., United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696 (1961) (misrepresentation);
Dupree v. United States, 264 F.2d 140 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 823 (1959) (in-
terference with contract); Di Silvestro v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y.),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 825 (1960) (libel).
102. "[The President] shall nominate and by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of
the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States . . . ." U.S. CoNST.
art. II, § 2.
103. E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 2104 (1970), which defines officers to include only those re-
quired by law to be appointed in the civil service by the President, a court of the United
States, the head of an executive agency, or the secretary of a military department.
104. Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512 (1920); United States v. Smith, 124 U.S.
525 (1888); United States v. Mouat, 124 U.S. 303 (1888); United States v. Hartwell,
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385 (1867); Hoeppel v. United States, 85 F.2d 237 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 299 U.S. 557 (1936); Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902 (D.D.C. 1967).
105. On the question of who are "employees" under the FTCA see Annot., 57
A.L.R.2d 1448 (1958).
106. Apparently certain BNDD employees had, at the time of the Collinsville raids,
statutory authority to execute searches and make arrests. 21 U.S.C. § 878 (1970).
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Attorney General'02 and is empowered to conduct searches. 108 There-
fore, the statute would seem to permit certain prisoners, unlawfully held,
first to secure release on a habeas corpus petition and thereafter to
recover damages from the federal government for false imprisonment. 0 9
Other unforeseen occasions for litigation may be available under the
amendment, awaiting only recognition by creative attorneys. For exam-
ple, illegal seizure of evidence from a criminal defendant currently
constitutes a routine ground for a suppression hearing prior to trial.
There is no apparent reason why it should not in the future also be the
occasion for the initiation of a civil suit against the government."1 '
In any case, as indicated earlier, no use of the amendment is
possible without constant attention to the peculiarities of the FTCA.
Because of a perhaps hasty decision to draft this intentional tort provi-
sion into the FTCA-a statute originally framed with negligence liabili-
ty in mind-several key assumptions of the new amendment's drafters
almost certainly lack foundation. Three of the most serious problem
areas deserve close attention.
B. Special Features of the FTCA
(1) The Law of the Place
The jurisdictional provision under which FTCA suits are brought
reads in pertinent part:
Subject to -the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district
courts, together with the United States District Court for the District
of the Canal Zone and the District Court of the Virgin Islands,
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against
the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after Jan-
uary 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury
or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting within the.scope of his
office or employment, under circumstances where the United States,
107. 18 U.S.C.A. § 4001(b)(1) (Supp. 1976).
108. See Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 21 (1919); Hayes v. United States,
367 F.2d 216, 221 (10th Cir. 1966).
109. The United States may clearly be held liable for negligent treatment of a pris-
oner under certain circumstances. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963). See
also Fleishour v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 762 (N.D. IMI. 1965), aff'd, 365 F.2d 126
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 987 (1966).
110. This was a particular concern of Representative Wiggins, who opposed this




if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission cccurred. 11'
The new intentional tort claims, of course, fall within the clause of
section 1346 permitting suit for a "wrongful" act or omission" 2
The first feature in this section that requires comment is the phrase
"in accordance with the law of the place." The impact of that phrase,
as the history of its application to negligence actions since 1946 makes
clear, 1 3 is that there is no uniform federal law of tort liability. When
sovereign immunity was abrogated in 1946, Congress (lid not see the
need to fashion a single law of federal negligence liability. Instead,
Congress apparently reasoned that it was appropriate for both plaintiff
and defendant to be governed by the usual rules of liability in the place
where the accident occurred. Thus, for example, a federal mail
truck driver who accidentally struck another vehicle in Florida would be
subject to whatever liability that state imposed upon negligent drivers
generally." 4 Such a variegated pattern of culpability may make sense
in the context of negligent tort recovery, but its rationale in suits against
law enforcement officials for intentional torts seems unjustified. The
amendment seeks to establish a standard of appropriate conduct for
all federal officials who are charged with responsibility for ensuring
constitutional rights. To make this demonstrably federal standard
dependent upon state law turns the liability question on its head.
The Collinsville raids, it should be recalled, were carried out in Illinois
by federal agents operating out of DALE's St. Louis, Missouri, office.
Few would contend that the elements of a claim against such miscon-
duct should vary because the officers crossed a state line to make their
raid. While it may be true that elements defining intentional torts may,
like those of negligence, be similar in many states, the possibilities for
111. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970). Venue of an FTCA claim is governed by id. §
1402(b).
112. The House committee version, which included claims arising out of "negligent
or wrongful act or omission," prevailed over the Senate bill, which covered only claims
arising out of negligence. H. "REP. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1942). See
Myers & Myers, Inc., v. United States Postal Service, 527 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 1975)
(questioning whether termination of contract is "wrongful act").
113. "What this means is that the Act does not create new causes of action-in the
sense of inventing new types of torts-but provides for the acceptance of liability by
the United States for the misconduct of its employees when such misconduct constitutes
an actionable wrong under the law of the state where it occurred, subject to the other
restrictions or limitations of the Tort Claims Act." -1 JAYSqN, supra note 57, § 217.01,
at 9-133.
114. E.g., Beit v. United States, 260 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1958); see American Ex-
change Bank v. United States, 257 F.2d 938 (7th Cir. 1958).
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uneven coverage remain and must be taken into account under the
amendment. And claims and defenses are not the only aspects of a suit
governed by state law. Damages are also assessed in accordance with
the applicable state standard, 115 except insofar as that standard is con-
trary to the explicit terms of the FTCA.1" 6 Under section 2674, for
instance, prejudgment interest may not be recovered in an FTCA
suit."17  More importantly, section 2674 precludes the recovery of
punitive damages-often an important element of an intentional tort
recovery-except in the circumscribed instance explained in the stat-
ute.1
8
One of the strangest results inferred by courts from the "law of the
place" doctrine involves "scope of employment."110 After a sharp split
among circuit courts 2 ' the Supreme Court held in Williams v. United
States '2 that state respondeat superior law would determine whether a
government employee in an FTCA action was acting within the scope of
his employment for liability purposes. 22  This recourse to state law
principles has been held appropriate even as to the actions of military
personnel. 2  By contrast, whether one is a "federal employee" within
the meaning of the FCTA is a question of federal law.124  But since
the amendment by its terms applies to federal "officers," and since the
115. Cf. Williams v. United States, 379 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1967).
116. Cf. Buchanan v.,United States, 305 F.2d 738 (8th Cir. 1962).
117. E.g., Mills v. Tucker, 499 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1974).
118. "If, however, in any case wherein death was caused, the law of the place where
the act or omission complained of provides, or has been construed to provide, for dam-
ages only punitive in nature, the United States shall be liable for actual or compensatory
damages, measured by the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death to the persons
respectively, for whose benefit the action was brought, in lieu thereof." 28 U.S.C. §
2674 (1970). This provision is clearly meant to permit damages under statutes such
as the Massachusetts Death Act. See Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. United
States, 352 U.S. 128 (1956).
119. See text accompanying note 111 slipra.
120. Compare United States v. Lushbough, 200 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1952); United
States v. Eleazer, 177 F.2d 914 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 903 (1950); and
Hubsch v. United States, 174 F.2d 7 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 338 U.S. 814, opinion
on settlement, 338 U.S. 440 (1949), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 340 U.S. 804
(1950); with Christian v. United States, 184 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1950); and Murphey v.
United States, 79 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Cal. 1948), rev'd, 179 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1950).
121. 350 U.S. 857 (1955) (per curiam).
122. See, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 429 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Holcombe, 259 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1958); see Annot., 6 A.L.R. FED. 373
(1971).
123. Williams v. United States, 350 U.S. 857 (1955); Badger State Mut. Cas. Co.
v. United States, 383 F. Supp. 1226 (E.D. Wis. 1974), criticized in Faix, Althea
Williams Revisited: "Line of Duty" Cases-Need for Reconsideration, 26 FED. B.J. 12
(1966).
124. LeFevere v. United States, 362 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1966); Pattno v. United
States, 311 F.2d 604 (10th Cir. 1962).
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legacy of section 1983 litigation is available to aid the definitional proc-
ess, the question of scope of employment in litigation under the amend-
ment should be answered independently of prior interpretations under
the general provisions of the FTCA.125
(2) "Private Person" Analogy
A second feature of the FTCA that poses problems for suits
brought under the new amendment is the phrase that holds the federal
government liable "under circumstances where the United States, if a
private person, would be liable."'126  This restriction is repeated at
another place in the Act: "The United States shall be liable, respecting
the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and
to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances
.. . . ," As was true with the "law of the place' doctrine, the
"private person" doctrine seems more appropriately applied to negligent
torts than to intentional tortious activity. Many law enforcement activi-
ties that might call forth an FTCA suit have no clear private analogies,
and state standards of liability may not exist.'18  When it comes to
liability for constitutional torts, there is by definition no analogy to
equivalent injuries by private persons. Even in the negligence area, the
ambiguity of the doctrine generated serious judicial disagreement for the
first decade after the adoption of the FTCA.129  The history of interpre-
125. For comparison, it may be useful to turn to the "under color of law" discussion
in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-87 (1961), which made it clear that state officials
would be acting under color of law (or here, within the scope of their employment)
when they violated a person's constitutional rights in derogation of specific statutory du-
ties to the contrary.
126. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970).
127. Id. § 2674.
128. As Louis Jaffe remarked, "the complex and various activities of government
and the activities of private enterprise are as different as they are alike, and the appli-
cation of a doctrine of respondeat superior to government raises a host of problems for
which the private law provides doubtful analogies." Jaffe, supra note 46, at 211.
129. In one of the first important cases, Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135
(1950), plaintiffs' deceased had perished in a barracks fire while on active military duty.
Plaintiff alleged negligent failure to maintain an adequate night watch and careless use
of barracks with certain dangerous heating defects. Among other justifications for re-
jecting the claim the Supreme Court stated: "One obvious shortcoming in these claims
is that plaintiffs can point to no liability of a 'private individual' even remotely analo-
gous to that which they are asserting against the United States .... For no private
individual has power to conscript or mobilize a private army." Id. at 141. The restric-
tive reading espoused in Feres was continued in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15
(1953), in which the Supreme Court agreed with a circuit court's rejection of govern-
mental liability based on negligent firefighting by the Coast Guard, finding no "analo-
gous liability" to the law of torts. Id. at 42. Two years later, in Indian Towing Co.
v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955), the Court was faced with a plaintiff whose barge
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tation of the doctrine, however, demonstrates a gradually more flexible
reading of the clause that has extended rather than restricted the govern-
ment's liability.
Rayonier Inc. v. United States,30 a case in which the Forest Service
had mismanaged a firefighting effort in a public forest, causing damage
to private citizens, clarified any doubts about the Court's intention to
move toward greater governmental liability. The district court had
dismissed on the ground that firefighting was without private analo-
gy.131 On appeal, the government relied upon earlier cases like Dale-
hite v. United States32 and Indian Towing Co. v. United States'"3
suggesting that liability be analyzed along the governmental-versus-
proprietary lines that had been developed in the law governing munici-
pal corporations. 34 The Supreme Court rejected the municipal corpo-
ration analogy entirely: "We expressly decided in Indian Towing that
the United States' liability is not restricted to the liability of a municipal
corporation or other public body. . . . To the extent that there was
anything to the contrary in the Dalehite case it was necessarily rejected
by Indian Towing."' s5 In an important interpretation of the congres-
sional intent behind the FTCA, the Court continued:
It may be that it is "novel and unprecedented" to hold the United
States accountable for the negligence of its firefighters, but the
very purpose of the Tort Claims Act was to waive -the Government's
traditional all-encompassing immunity from tort actions and to
establish novel and unprecedented government liability.'8 6
had run aground because of Coast Guard negligence in failing to keep a lighthouse oper-
ational. The Government argued, naturally, that there was no "private person" analogy.
The majority opinion, however, distinguished Feres as merely precluding suits by service-
men for service-related injuries. Dalehite was rejected for reasons not fully expressed.
With reasoning which presaged-if indeed it did not initiate-a broader reading of the
clause, the Court remarked: "The Government reads the statute as if it imposed liability
to the same extent as would be imposed on a private individual 'under the same circum-
stances.' But the statutory language is 'under like circumstances,' and it is hornbook
tort law that one who undertakes to warn the public of danger and thereby induces re-
liance must perform... in a careful manner." Id. at 64-65.
130. 352 U.S. 315 (1957).
131. See 225 F.2d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 1955) (affirming dismissal by the District
Court).
132. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
133. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
134. 225 F.2d at 645-46. For a discussion of governmental versus proprietary func-
tions in municipal corporation tort immunity see W. PnossER, HAtNDBooa OF Trm LAW
oF TORTS § 131, at 977-84 (4th ed. 1971).
135. 352 U.S. at 319. This analysis had already been rejected by certain lower fed-
eral courts. Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955);
Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States, 193 F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1951); Cerri v. United
States, 80 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal. 1948).
136. 352 U.S. at 319. It is important to note that even if the state government
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Most subsequent cases have followed Rayonier's lead in holding the
government liable for activities in which negligence has been clear."3 7
Against this background, an expansive reading of the "private
person" doctrine in the intentional tort context seems justified. Fur-
thermore, the insistence by the Senate drafters that no special govern-
mental defenses preclude federal liability13 should mean, at the least,
that the government could claim no defenses-apart from those in the
FTCA itself-that are unavailable to a private defendant. Thus, for
example, an erroneous forced entry by law enforcement officers into an
apartment should be tortious under the FTCA even if the search met
constitutional requirements of probable cause and "reasonableness."
Under well-known standards of tort law, a trespass can be committed
even if the offender does not intend the violation but inadvertently
wanders onto another's land. 39 Of course such a remedy would clearly
move beyond redress merely for "constitutional torts." Although cer-
tain language in the legislative report seems to stop short of such an
expanded concept of liability, 140 the sense of Congress' action in re-
sponse to Collinsville tends to reinforce this broader interpretation.
(3) The Due Care Defense and the "Discretionary
Function Exception"
The FTCA is not simply a signpost directing a litigant toward state.
law. Two very important federal defenses drafted into section 2680(a)
offer serious impediments to a successful claim against the government.
The section reads:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title
shall not apply to-
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of
-the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a
statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regula-
tion be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or
duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the
would be immune from suit under state law for an lleged act or omission, an FTCA
plaintiff can nevertheless sue the United Sates if a private individual would be liable
under the law of that state. Big Head v. United States, 166 F. Supp. 510 (D. Mont.
1958).
137. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963); Downs v. United States, 522
F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 4975).
138. See text accompanying notes 84-86 supra.
139. W. PROSSER, supra note 134, § 13, at 74.
140. See text accompanying note 166 infra.
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Government, whether or not the discretion involved be
abused.141
As Jayson has observed:
It is evident from the legislative history and the courts' interpreta-
tion of section 2680(a) that the first clause of the section was de-
signed to prevent litigants from utilizing a suit in tort under the
Act as a means of testing the constitutionality or legality of laws
or regulations, and that the second was designed to remove from
the coverage of the Act claims based upon governmental conduct
which, under traditional principles, falls within the broad ambit of
so-called discretionary functions. 142
Because negligent torts, almost by definition, do not occur in "the
exercise of due care," there have been few cases interpreting that clause.
The clause could experience much greater litigation in the intentional
torts context, however, since it is reminiscent of the good faith immunity
defense that has been developed under section 1983.1'3 If DALE
regulations covering search and seizure methods, for example, were to
be drafted in such a fashion that they mandated or even permitted
tortious conduct, the government might argue that a law enforcement
officer's "due care" execution of such regulations in "good faith" should
insulate the government from suit under the FTCA.
Fortunately, the slim precedent in this area appears to refute such a
broad reading of the clause. In Hatahley v. United States,'4" eight
Navajo families who lived on public lands in San Juan County, Utah,
sued the federal government to recover damages for the destruction of
their horses, which had been permitted to roam freely. Apparently
federal agents, who wished the Indians to leave their homesites, had
used Utah's "abandoned horse statute" to round up and destroy the
animals. 45 After finding that the FTCA was applicable and that the
agents were acting within the scope of their employment, 40 the United
States Supreme Court turned to the question of the section 2680(a)
exclusions:
141. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970). A number of cases have interpreted the discre.
tionary function exception not merely as a defense but as a jurisdictional barrier. E.g.,
Sickman v. United States, 184 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1950); Coates v. United States, 181
F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1950); Sisley v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 273 (D. Alas. 1962).
142. Jayson, Applications of the Discretionary Function Exception, 24 FED. BJ.
153, 154 (1964).
143. See note 62 supra.
144. 351U.S.-173 (1956).
145. Id. at 175-76.
146. Id. at 180.
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The first portion of section (a) cannot apply-here, since the govern-
ment agents were not exercising due care in their enforcement of
-the federal law. "Due care" implies at least some minimal concern
for the rights of others. Here, the agents proceeded with complete
disregard for the property rights of the petitioners.147
This language would seem to indicate that actions taken by law enforce-
ment officers in the execution of otherwise valid regulations that hap-
pen to infringe private rights have not been taken 'in due care." In-
deed, the question Hatahley invites is for what does an officer exercise
due care if not for the rights of those whom his actions are affecting?
More expansively interpreted, however, Hatahley could form the
basis for an attack against the clause's apparent exemption for any
actions taken pursuant to invalid regulations or statutes-regulations
that infringe a citizen's rights on their face, rather than merely as
applied. The Court's reading of "due care" to imply at least some
minimal concern for the rights of others might be characterized as an
insistence that such rights cannot be ignored with impunity, either by
the party taking the action or by the party drafting guidelines. 4 " It
would be unconscionable for a court to permit recovery against an FBI
agent for tortious acts committed on his own in a citizen's apartment,
while denying recovery if such improper conduct is outlined in a govern-
ment manual. In short, recovery of damages, at least for constitutional
violations, should not be precluded by the language of section 2680(a).
Any legitimate legislative concern that litigants not be permitted to use
the FTCA to challenge the legality of statutes can be preserved by
reading section 2680(a) merely to restrict a litigant's ability to obtain
declaratory or injuctive relief under the statute. 4 9 Recovery of dam-
ages by an injured citizen, on the other hand, should be permitted, since
damages may place an objective measure on the constitutional injuries
resulting from such regulations and statutes.
Unlike the "due care" clause, the "discretionary function" clause
has been extensively litigated, 50 and has probably spawned more litera-
147. Id. at 181.
148. An example of a government program with ominous overtones for constitu-
tional rights is the FBI's COINTELPRO program. Since the late 1930's, the FBI has
collected and disseminated personal information about the private lives of thousands of
law-abiding American citizens in an effort to discredit or "neutralize" alleged "sub-
versives" or "extremists." Letter from Senator Walter Mondale to Paul Verkuil, Jan.
6, 1976, enclosure 1 [hereinafter cited as Mondale Letter].
149. See text accompanying notes 190-91 infra.
150. See Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173 (1956); United States v. Union
Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1955) (per curiam); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350
U.S. 61 (1955); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); Feres v. United States,
340 U.S. 135 (1950); Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1974); Pigott
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ture than any other single provision in the FTCA.15 ' The discretionary
function exception can best be seen as a legislative effort to protect
necessary (but necessarily imperfect) governmental decisions from un-
reasonable attack. While Congress was content to accept financial
liability for, a mailman's negligent inattention to a traffic light, it did not
intend to recompense a rural resident for a decision to cease daily
R.F.D. delivery. It is the latter kind of decision that the exception
attempts to protect.
One of the first and most significant interpretations of the clause by
the Supreme Court came in Dalehite v. United States. 2 In that case,
over three hundred plaintiffs sought damages for a devastating explosion
that occurred in Texas City, Texas in 1947. After World War II, the
-United States realized there was an export market for certain potentially
explosive chemicals manufactured during the war that could be used as
fertilizers. The United States government contracted with private firms
to operate certain former armaments plants under government supervi-
sion. Fertilizer destined for France was being loaded, under govern-
ment supervision, by stevedores onto French ships in the Texas City
harbor.15 3 A small fire that developed in the hold of one ship was not
put out quickly, and the ensuing explosions levelled a sizable portion of
the town. ,"Since no individual acts of negligence [were] shown, the
[suit] . . . necessarily predicated government liability on the partici-
pation of the United States in the manufacture and the transportion of
[fertilizer]."154
The Supreme Court analyzed section 2680 in terms of "planning"
versus "operational" decisions:
The "discretion" protected by the section ... is the discretion
of the executive or the administrator to act according to one's judg-
ment of the best course, a concept of substantial historical ancestry
in American law. 15
v. United States, 451 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1971); Hendry v. United States, 418 F.2d 774
(2d Cir. 1969).
151. See, e.g., James, The Federal Tort Claims Act and the "Discretionary Func-
tion" Exception: The Sluggish Retreat of an Ancient Immunity, 10 U. FLA. L. Ra'v.
184 (1957); Peck, The Federal Tort Claims Act: A Proposed Construction of the Dis-
cretionary. Function Exception, 31 WASH. L. Rlv. 207 (1956); Reynolds, Discretionary
Function Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 57 GEo. L.J. 81 (1968); Note, 41
WAsH. L Rav. 340 (1966). See generally Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 1016 (1965); Annot.,
19 A.LR.2d 845 (1951).
152. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
153. Id. at 17-24.
154. Id. at 23.
155. Id. at 34 (footnote omitted).
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It is enough to hold, as we do, that the "discretionary function
or duty" that cannot form a basis for suit under the Tort Claims Act
includes more than the initiation of programs and activities. It also
includes determinations made by executives or administrators in
establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations. Where
there is room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion.
It necessarily follows that acts of subordinates in carrying out the
operations of government in accordance with official directions
cannot be actionable. 15 6
In short, the alleged "negligence" does not subject the Govern-
ment to liability. The decisions held culpable were all responsibly
made at a planning rather than operational level. .... 157
The recognition that certain governmental decisions must be protected
against litigation was not new; it had earlier met with general judicial
recognition.' 58 Almost any official act is taken pursuant to some sort of
plan, however, and government lawyers subsequently used Dalehite to
urge courts to reject liability for many acts that clearly involved negli.-
gent execution of a plan or idea. Although some courts drew a distinc-
tion "between acts or omissions arising from the exercise or performance
of a discretionary function and those occurring within the scope or area
of the discretionary function but which themselves do not involve any
proper element of discretion,"' 159 other courts took Dalehite as a license
to strike down arguably valid claims.' 60
More reflective courts came to realize that a "planning-operation-
al" distinction, based exclusively on the level of the public official in-
volved, was not conclusive of the issue. One influential discussion of
156. Id. at 35-36 (footnote omitted).
157. Id. at 42.
158. E.g., Sickman v. United States, 184 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341
U.S. 939 (1951); Coates v. United States, 181 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1950).
159. Bulloch v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 885, 888 (D. Utah 1955). See also
Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States, 193 F.2d 631, 635 (4th Cir. 1951).
160. For example, in Fahey v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1957),
executors sued the government on behalf of a deceased woman who had been shot by
a demented military veteran. The United States was alleged to have been negligent in
permitting the veteran to remain at large, given psychiatric difficulties known to public
medical officials. Id. at 886. In determining liability, the court reasoned: "In this case
the acts of the psychiatrists involved come within the scope of the term 'discretionary
function.' They were retained to make professional diagnoses and if any error was com-
mitted it was an error in the exercise of their authorized discretion resulting from an
improper diagnosis. Such conduct is clearly within the scope of the exception and
clearly not actionable." Id. at 886. See also Williams v. United States, 115 F. Supp.
386 (N.D. Fla. 1953), affd, 218 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1955); Thomas v. United States,
81 F. Supp. 881 (W.D. Mo. 1949).
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the question occurred in Bulloch v. United States.16' Certain sheep
owners had sued the United States for injuries arising out of nuclear
testing in Nevada. In assessing judicial precedent, the court noted:
Where the acts or omissions relied upon are those directly involving
the exercise of discretion, the Courts have not hesitated to deny
recovery .... Where it is clear, as here, that the major, or overall,
activity involved the exercise of a discretionary function or duty
... but where the acts or omissions relied upon may be substan-
tially independent of, or merely incidental to, any authorized dis-
cretionary performance, difficulty and conflict are indicated in
the decisions.' 62
The court then noted that one line of cases, which arguably included
Dalehite, appeared to deny liability for all acts taken within the scope
and in the course of performance of a discretionary function. After
discussion the court stated, "I conclude that negligent performance,
after discretion has been exercised, and not involving any discretionary
power, is not contemplated by the cited exception concerning discretion-
ary functions."'163
If determination of the proper scope of the discretionary function
exception is difficult in the context of good faith plans and their
negligent execution, the question obviously becomes much cloudier
when one considers treatment of intentional torts. The discretionary
function exception protects the executive branch from too close scrutiny
of policy decisions. But the permissible scope of executive decision-
making as to actions or policies that may prove deliberately tortious
presents a different issue. Several points should be stressed. First, the
brief legislative history of the amendment makes clear that, at the very
least, Congress did not intend to create a blanket exemption from
liability for all decisions calling for discretion. The overzealous deci-
sions and actions of St. Louis DALE officers resulted in property
damage and infringement of the privacy of the Askews and Giglottos.
The legislation drafted in response to those raids was meant to provide
financial compensation both for property loss and psychological inju-
ry.16 4  A broad reading of the exception so as to exclude recovery by
161. 133 F. Supp. 885 (D. Utah 1955). But cf. Bartholomae Corp. v. United
States, 135 F. Supp. 651 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
162. 133 F. Supp. at 887-88.
163. Id. at 889. See also Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1975);
Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1974); United Air Lines, Inc.
v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. disnissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); White v.
United States, 317 F.2d 13, 16-17 (4th Cir. 1963); cf. United States v. Faneca, 332 F.2d
872 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 971 (1965).
164. S. REP. No. 588, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973), stresses the reasons for the
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those wronged by the Collinsville raids would deny the impetus for the
amendment itself.
One possibility would be to preserve liability only for those discre-
tionary actions that violate a citizen's constitutional rights, as opposed to
the general class of intentional torts that may not rise to that level.1 1
Since the Collinsville raids were conducted without a search or arrest
warrant, in violation of the fourth amendment, recovery in that case
would be permitted. This restrictive interpretation finds some sup-
port in the Senate report on the amendment:
As a general principle under present law, if a Federal agent vio-
lates someone's constitutional rights-for instance, Fourth Amend-
ment rights against illegal search and seizure-there is no remedy
against the Federal Government. This ancient doctrine-sovereign
immunity-stands as a bar.
Only recently was there even a right of action against the
offending officers themselves. In the case of Bivens v. Six Un-
known Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Su-
preme Court held that the Fourth Amendment and elementary
justice require that there be a right of action against the Federal
agents for illegal searches conducted in bad faith or without prob-
able cause ....
... This provision should be viewed as a counterpart to the
Bivens case and its progenty ,[sic], in that it waives the defense of
sovereign immunity... for the same type of conduct that is alleged
to have occurred in Bivens .... 166
However, later in the Senate report this narrow reading is rejected:
"Tlhe Committee's amendment should not be viewed as limited to
constitutional tort situations but would apply to any case in which a
Federal law enforcement agent committed the tort while acting within
the scope of his employment or under color of Federal law.' 67
A better reading would make the government responsible whenev-
er overzealous officers act tortiously against a citizen, and whenever an
official at any level deliberately plans, authorizes or approves actions
that amount to "constitutional torts"-violations of guarantees afforded
amendment: "There is no effective legal remedy against the Federal Government for
the actual physical damage, much less the pain, suffering and humiliation to which the
Collinsville families have been subjected."
165. What is or is not sufficient to make an intentional tort rise to the level of con-
stitutional tort has no easy answer. See Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228, 1232
(4th Cir. 1970) (requiring "raw abuse of power by a police officer").
166. S. REP. No. 588, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1973).
167. Id. at 4.
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by the Constitution. This use of the discretionary function defense for
intentional torts does not do violence to the legislative purpose behind
the exception. As the Eighth Circuit once observed in defense of the
doctrine:
The Congress had a sound basis for the use of the words in the
Exceptions of the Act and used them in recognition of the separa-
tion of powers. . . and the considerations of public policy which
have moved the courts to refuse to interfere with the actions of
officials at all levels of the executive branch who, acting within the
scope of their authority, were required to exercise discretion or
judgment.168
The invocation of the separation of powers doctrine is proper insofar as
it seeks merely to maintain essential flexibility of executive decisionmak-
ing, free from financial liability for every error in judgment. No
comparable freedom exists, or should exist, for the government to plan
or to approve deliberate torts or attacks on private freedoms.6 9 Insofar
as the discretionary function exception is advanced as a shield against
deliberate wrongdoing of this kind, the claim should be rejected even if
it involves the Chief Executive. 170 The intent of the amendment 7 is to
provide recovery for injuries caused by government eyen in instances in
which the government believed such actions necessary to meet some
misguided notions of internal security.
(4) Other Exceptions to Liability
Certain narrow restrictions on FTCA liability are built into section
2680, including a specific exception for claims "arising in respect of the
assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of
any goods or merchandise by any officer of customs or excise or any
other law enforcement officer;" 72 for any claim involving administra-
tion of the Trading with the Enemy Act; 73 for combatant activities dur-
168. Coates v. United States, 181 F.2d 816, 818 (8th Cir. 1950). The court then
cited a number of cases, beginning with Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803), in which the Supreme Court has dealt with the discretionary functioU issue in
its constitutional aspects.
169. What immediately comes to mind in this context is the short-lived and ill-fated
"Huston Plan" of Watergate fame and similar government programs by the FBI re-
cently uncovered. See Mondale Letter, supra note 148; cf. Kiiskila v. United States, 466
F.2d 626 (7th Cir. 1972).
170. Compare United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); United States v. United
States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
171. See text accompanying notes 84-86 supra.
172. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (1970).
173. Id. § 2680(e).
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ing time of war;174 or for any claim arising in a foreign country. 7 5
Careful attention obviously should be paid to the rather obscure provi-
sions of this section by potential litigants, even though they may be in-
applicable to the vast run of cases.
IV. PRACTICE UNDER Thm A.mNDMENT
As should be clear by now, the FTCA is a statute of unique
complexity. Some of the basic conceptual problems that arise from
the use of the FTCA as a vehicle for intentional torts liability have
already been addressed. But it seems advisable to provide a brief
roadmap to the special practice and procedural requirements to which
an attorney unfamiliar with FTCA practice, but now placed within its
ambit, should devote close attention. It is the understanding of the
authors that to date no judgments or settlements have been concluded
under the amendment. Since the amendment offers new sources of
liability for governmental conduct, this inactivity may reflect a lack of
awareness on the part of the practicing bar of its availability.
A. Jurisdiction and Venue
Jurisdiction of an FTCA suit is vested in the United States district
courts.'7 6 The court in which a litigant sues also has jurisdiction of
related counterclaims or setoffs by the federal govermnent.' 77  Any
appeal from a district court judgment may be taken to, the Court of
Claims with the consent of all appellees.' Otherwise, appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals is available as a matter of right.'7
Venue can be laid only in the district in which plaintiff resides or in
which the offensive act or omission occurred. 80
B. Administrative Claim and Statute of Limitations
Before any action may be brought in a federal court, the FTCA
requires that a claimant first present his claim to an appropriate federal
174. Id. § 2680(i).
175. Id. § 2680(k).
176. Id. § 1346(b). Suits by inhabitants of foreign countries against the United
States, as well as suits by United States citizens dwelling abroad, for tortious activity
outside the United States are not covered by the FTCA.
177. Id. § 1346(c).
178. Id. § 1504.
179. Id. §§ 1291-94.
180. Id. § 1402(b).
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agency for administrative settlement.' 81 The agency then has up to six
months to make final disposition of the claim. If there is no disposition
after six months, the claimant may deem the claim finally denied and
pursue his court remedy. Framing the claim to the federal agency
should be done only after careful consideration, since the FTCA prohib-
its an action for an amount greater than that presented to the federal
agency, "except where the increased amount is based upon newly
discovered evidence not reasonably discoverable at the time of present-
ing the claim to the federal agency, or upon allegation and proof of
intervening facts, relating to the amount of the claim."' 82  Under the
FTCA, each federal agency head has the power to compromise tort
claims up to $25,000. A settlement over that amount requires written
approval of the Attorney General.' 8 1
The statute of limitations on tort claims under the FTCA is gov-
erned by federal law, not by the applicable state statutory period.' 84
Federal law bars any claim that is not presented, in writing, to the appro-
priate federal agency within two years after the claim accrues or that is
not "begun within six months after the date of mailing ... of notice of
final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was presented." 181
Thus a claimant must present his claim to any agency within two years
after it accrues. He may begin an action six months after this claim has
been presented. Unless he sues within six months after the mailing of a
final denial, the claim is barred.
C. Parties
An FTCA suit is properly brought against the United States, not
against the offending individuals or the agency of which they are em-
ployees. Federal employees who may desire to sue federal law en-
181. Id. § 2675; see 28 C.F.R. § 14.1 et seq. (1975) for the rules promulgated by
the Attorney General respecting presentation of administrative claims. If a suit is filed
prior to submission of an administrative claim, dismissal is appropriate. Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania v. National Ass'n of Flood Insurers, 520 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1975); Alt-
man v. Connally, 456 F.2d 1114 (2d Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Bialowas v. United
States, 443 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1971). Counsel for plaintiff should be careful to comply
fully with. whatever procedural requirements an agency might have established for filing
a formal claim. Merely sending a letter seeking relief may well be inadequate and con-
stitute ground for dismissal of a subsequent suit. See, e.g., Melo v. United States, 505
F.2d 1026 (8th Cir. 1974). See generally Annot., 13 A.L.R. FED. 762 (1972).
182. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b) (1970).
183. Id. §§ 2672, 2677; 28 C.F.R. § 14.6 (1975).
184. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2401(b) (Supp. 1976); Young v. United States, 184 F.2d 587,
589 (D.C. Cir. 1950). See generally Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 732 (1966); Annot., 21
A.L.R.2d 1464 (1952).
185. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2401(b) (Supp. 1976).
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forcement officers under the FTCA, but cannot, should check closely
the provisions of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, which is
the exclusive remedy of a federal employee suing for death or personal
injury caused by the actions of another federal employee. 180 Certain
other classes of plaintiffs are restricted from bringing tort actions
against the government and recourse must be had to the myriad of stat-
utes involved.' 8 7 If a federal employee (or, in the intentional tort case,
a federal officer) is sued individually, it is clear he may implead the
United States. 8
D. Jury Trial
An FTCA claim against the government is triable only without a
jury, notwithstanding any right to jury trial that may exist under the
equivalent local statute governing tort liability. This is a restriction not
present in actions under Bivens or section 1983 and it may in the
appropriate situation suggest the advisability of actions against the
individual agents as well.
E. Damages and Declaratory Relief
As we have seen, the FTCA precludes any recovery for punitive
damages, except that, in a state whose law permits only punitive dam-
ages for the death of a claimant, the Act allows the successful estate
to recover actual or pecuniary damages "measured by the pecuniary
injuries resulting from such death to the persons respectively, for whose
benefit the action was brought, in lieu thereof."'" 9  The effect of
the quoted language is to ignore any state law attempts to restrict
recovery in such instances, and to permit compensatory damages wheth-
er designated as "compensatory" or "punitive."
Some question exists as to the availability of declaratory relief
under the FTCA. Some courts apparently would allow it, following the
rationale sketched by Jayson:
The rationale is that, although the Declaratory Judgment Act
is not itself a consent of the United States to be sued, it is an addi-
186. 5 id. §§ 8101 et seq. See generally Annot., 17 L Ed. 2d 9"29 (1967); Annot.,
84 A.L.R.2d 1059 (1962).
187. See generally JAYSON, supra note 57, §§ 150-67.
188. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951). However, the United
States may not indemnify itself against a recovery by bringing suit against the federal
employee responsible for the tort-a right any private employer would have against its
employee. United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954).
189. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1970).
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tional remedy in cases where jurisdiction already exists; accord-
ingly, if the basic claim is within the coverage of the Tort Claims
Act, a suit for declaratory judgment is simply a procedural step
toward -the ultimate determination of a claim for money damages.1 90
The argument against use of the declaratory judgment is twofold.
Section 1346(b) vests jurisdiction in district courts only to hear claims
"for money damages." Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the legisla-
tive rationale behind section 2680(h) seems to evince a desire to
prevent the FTCA from becoming a vehicle to challenge generally the
legality of a government procedure. Nevertheless, if federal courts read
the statute to permit declaratory actions involving intentional torts, the
amendment could prove a helpful weapon with which to attack uncon-
stitutional law enforcement procedures. Rather than simply suing a
federal agency for a money judgment in the wake of an agency burglary
"for national security," a litigant could urge the district court to declare
such conduct tortious.' 9'
F. Interest, Costs and Attorneyd Fees
A successful litigant can recover four percent interest from the date
of judgment until "thirty days after the approval of any appropriation
Act."' 19 2 Prejudgment interest, in other words, is not permitted.
The FTCA permits, but does not mandate, a court to award costs
to the successful litigant, or to the government if it prevails. The costs
shall "be limited to reimbursing in whole or in part the prevailing party
for the costs incurred by him in the litigation."'1 8
One of the strangest provisions of the FTCA relates to attorneys'
fees. .The Act limits an attorney to twenty-five percent of any
judgment recovered or any settlement made after litigation has com-
menced. If the claim has been administratively compromised prior to
suit, the maximum recovery is twenty percent. "Any attorney who
charges, demands, receives, or collects for services rendered in connec-
tion with such claim any amount in excess of that allowed under this
section, if recovery be had, shall be fined not more than $2,000 or
imprisoned not more than one year or both."'' 4 One can only urge due
care in billing to avoid this stringent penalty.
190. JAYSON, supra note 57, § 211.02, at 9-8 (footnote omitted). See Luckenbach
S.S. Co. v. United States, 292 F.2d 913, 916 n.5 (Ct. C1. 1961); cf. Raydist Navigation
Corp. v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Va. 1956).
191. See text accompanying notes 169 & 187 supra.
192. 28 U.S.C. § 2411(b) (1970).
193. Id. § 2412.
194. Id. § 2678 (emphasis added).
536 [Vol. 54
INTENTIONAL TORTS AMENDMENT
G. Judgment as Bar
Although the FTCA does not explicitly insist that suit against the
government-as opposed to suit against the offending agent-be an
injured party's exclusive remedy, another section makes judgment in an
FTCA action a complete bar to an action against the individual govern-
ment employee. 95 In most instances, the preferred course will be to
pursue one's remedy against the government alone, in order to ensure a
source of recovery. However, section 2676 does not prevent a litigant
from first suing a government employee and thereafter, if execution of a
judgment leaves the plaintiff unsatisfied, suing the federal government
for the unsatisfied portion of the judgment.196  If personal vindication
against an offending federal law enforcement officer were a prime
motive, and if a jury trial were seen as indispensable, plaintiff could still
proceed on a Bivens theory or under state law before invoking the
FTCA.197
V. TE AMENDMENT AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
One serious question- raised by the passage of the amendment
concerns the continuing application by the Supreme Court of the exclu-
sionary rule to suppress evidence seized by law enforcement officials in
violation of the fourth amendment.'9 8  In his dissenting opinion in
Bivens Chief Justice Burger commenced a full scale attack on the
exclusionary rule, calling it "conceptually sterile and practically ineffec-
tive."'' 99 Nevertheless, the Chief Justice conceded the continuing ne-
cessity of the rule "until some meaningful substitute is developed."200
195. Id. § 2676.
196. Consider also id. § 2679(b), which makes suit against the government the ex-
clusive remedy "for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death, resulting from
the operation by any employee of the Government of any motor vehicle while acting
within the scope of his office or employment", and id. § 2679(d), which provides for re-
moval to the federal court of suits commenced in the state court against federal employ-
ees in the event that the United States acknowledges FTCA scope of employment lia-
bility.
197. He would, of course, keep a close eye on the FTCA statute of limitations. See
note 184 supra. There does not appear to be any impediment to commencing a Bivens
suit against the individual officer while at the same time pursuing settlement with the
United States.
198. See text accompanying note 110 supra. For a thoroughly researched analysis
of the fourth amendment and -the exclusionary rule see Harris, Annals of Law: The
Liberty of Every Man (pts. 1-2), THE NEw YoRnxi, Nov. 3, 1975, at 50; Nov. 10, 1975,
at 54.
199. 403 U.S. at 415.
200. Id.
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Reasonable and effective substitutes can be formulated if Congress
would take the lead, as it did for example in 1946 in the Federal
Tort Claims Act. I see no insuperable obstacle to the elimination
of -the suppression doctrine if Congress would provide some mean-
ingful and effective remedy against unlawful conduct by govern-
ment officials.
I conclude, therefore, that an entirely different remedy is
necessary .... Congress should develop an administrative or quasi-
judicial remedy against the government itself to afford compensa-
tion and restitution for persons whose Fourth Amendment rights
have been violated.20
Chief Justice Burger went on to sketch a statute that would waive
sovereign immunity "as to the illegal acts of law enforcement officials
committed in the performance of assigned duties," and would create a
forum in which to adjudicate such claims.202 Significantly, this "pro-
posal" would have tied such a provision to a statute that explicitly
abolished the exclusionary rule. "Any such legislation should empha-
size the interdependence between the waiver of sovereign immunity and
the elimination of the judicially created exclusionary rule so that if the
legislative determination to repudiate the exclusionary rule falls, the
entire statutory scheme would fall."" 3
The similarity between the Chief Justice's proposal and the amend-
ment is obvious, as was recognized during the debate in the House on
the amendment. Congressman Butler of Virginia specifically inquired
on March 5, 1974, whether the amendment's sponsors were clear as
to the effect of the legislation on the exclusionary rule. In response,
Congressman Wiggins of California said:
I will answer in this way. Many of us have been concerned for
many ydars about the rigid and mechanical operation of the exclu-
sionary rule. One suggestion made by such an eminent person as
-the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court has been to create a
civil remedy. I think -that is worthy of exploration. However, under
-this legislation the remedy is created without the 'benefits of that
exploration and without modifying this exclusionary rule.2 04
In light both of this disclaimer and of Congress' failure to draft an
explicit abolition of the exclusionary rule, it seems clear that no modi-
fication of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule was intended. Fur-
201. Id. at 421-22.
202. Id. at 422-23.
203. Id. at 423 n.7.
204. 120 CONG. R c. H 1400 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1974).
[Vol. 54
INTENTIONAL TORTS AMENDMENT
thermore, since Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion did not re-
ceive support from any other member of the Court, the argument that
somehow the amendment was Congress' response to a judicial invita-
tion is unconvincing. As a practical matter, one would not expect Con-
gress impliedly to exchange the exclusionary rule for a tort remedy that
poses as many obstacles to effective implementation as does the FTCA
amendment.205
VI. THE AmENDmENT As SPuR To FURTHER RsFoRM
As is clear from the foregoing analysis, the amendment is only a
partial step toward proper financial accountability by the federal g6vern-
ment for the injuries occasioned by its employees. It does provide a
much-needed legal remedy for the victims of federal law enforcement
abuse. However, the momentary public outrage over the Collinsville
raids, pragmatically channelled by congressional aides into a legislative
amendment acceptable to an impatient Congress, succeeded in produc-
ing a remedy that-as we have seen-is quite idiosyncratic. A recovery
scheme for intentional governmental torts needs more careful attention.
The amendment and subsequent events2° 6 may provide the impetus for a
thorough review of the entire field. For one thing, the need for a fed-
eral statutory remedy against federal officials other than law enforce-
ment officials who violate constitutional rights seems undiminished by
the availability of relief under Bivens. Difficulties inherent in a case by
case extension of Bivens suggest that the amendment of section 1983
to provide for coverage of federal as well as state officials would over-
come a long ignored anomaly in federal responsibility. 20 7
At least four further changes to the FTCA should be explored.
First, the elements of a federal cause of action should not depend on
205. A separate issue is whether Congress could by statute actually abolish the ex-
clusionary rule. See generally Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution
as a Sword, 85 HAv. L. REV. 1532, 1559-63 (1972). That issue is beyond the scope
of this article.
206. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities is currently wrestling
with the problem of recovery against FBI and CIA officials who violate constitutional
and statutory rights. S. Res. 21, 94th Cong.
207. Professor Davis has proposed language amending section 1983 that provides a
useful beginning. See Davis, An Approach to Legal Control of the Police, 52 TxAs
L. REv. 703, 720 n.47 (1974). Davis also provides in his proposed amendment of sec-
tion 1983 for recovery against federal and lbcal governments, thereby rendering redun-
dant the FTCA amendment. Whether or not it is better to include entity liability within
section 1983 (one argument against that solution is that intentional torts not reaching
the constitutional tort level are not covered by section 1983), that section should cer-
tainly be amended to reach federal as well as state and local officials.
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differences of state law. A federal statutory or common law of inten-
tional torts would avoid the "law of the place" and the "private person"
problems inherent in the FTCA as presently structured. It would
insure that tortious behavior by the FBI in California would receive
similar treatment to such behavior in Maine. The justification for a
local standard of behavior in the negligence area does not carry over to
the realm of intentional torts.
Secondly, liability should not be restricted merely to "law enforce-
ment officers." A deliberate battery is no less outrageous if inflicted by
a mailman or a welfare official than if inflicted by an FBI agent.
Although law enforcement officers more often have occasion for unfet-
tered abuse of the public trust, the modem social welfare state offers so
many potential conflicts between officials and individuals that there is
little justification for denying citizens redress for any governmental
wrongs. Anxiety about the number of claims can be met with several
responses. Any "flood of litigation" would presumably mean that the
new law would have uncovered grave and intolerable flaws in the
operation of our federal government. The fear of spurious claims
should be overcome by the realization that the judicial process has
available to it means for detecting such false claims. 208 And any
fear that citizens might be awarded excessive damages should be over-
come by the FTCA practice of non-jury trials. Additional safeguards,
such as placing a ceiling on recovery, should be disfavored.200
Thirdly, more careful treatment must be given the question wheth-
er governmental liability should supersede individual liability in its en-
tirety. While the Justice Department intended through its proposed bill
to place all federal officers beyond the threat of personal liability,10
some provision for personal liability seems a healthy tonic to encourage
respect for constitutional rights. Since the protection intended by the
Justice Department proposal has to some degree already been extended
to federal employees judicially by the rapid case law development of the
208. In the section 1983'area, for example, the federal courts, while faced with a
staggering caseload, have utilized various preclusion doctrines and summary decision
mechanisms to keep the cases under control. See generally McCormack, Federalism and
Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Protections (pts.
I & II), 60 VA. L. Rav. 1, 250 (1974).
209. This is the solution in 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1970), which provides for $1000
damages for each illegal wiretap. The danger of this approach is that federal officials
may see these amounts as merely the cost of doing business and effectively buy up an
individual's constitutional rights. Even the fear of an occasional large judgment may
not provide admirable official caution in this respect.
210. See text accompanying notes 73-75 supra.
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"official immunity doctrine,"21' there may be little need to go beyond
that defense. And since the rationale behind official immunity is
similar to that expressed in the discretionary function exception, the
FTCA currently reflects a form of immunity for government officials
that, without discharging them from all responsibility, protects the
independence and flexibility necessary for proper government decision-
making. There are important competing values to be considered. Sen-
ator Charles Percy has warned, "we must not lose sight of the important
deterrent value served by the threat of civil suits being brought against
offending agents. Federal narcotics officers must realize that they will
be held personally responsible for their intentional violation of constitu-
tional rights . *.".."212 After the incident at Collinsville, Illinois,
it was learned that several of the agents had been involved in other
unpalatable and illegal incidents; 213 attempts to exempt those individ-
ual officers from liability for assaults and batteries on private citizens
seem an excessive means to guarantee flexibility for proper police
functioning. The balance between these competing values is difficult
but not impossible to strike. The development of legislatively, specified
defenses along the lines of those that have been developed judicially
under section 1983 could be employed, or. the govermnent could be
given the right of subrogation against individual officials in extreme
cases involving fraud, corruption, or malice. 1 4 Either solution would
offer some further assurance that federal officials will find it in their
interest to learn about and respect the individual rights of citizens.
Another effective method of deterrence might be employed by
having Congress specify the sources from which government funds to
pay an FTCA judgment should come. Professor Kenneth Culp Davis
has expressed the belief that "[w]hat is needed is a deterrent that
operates not only against the agents but also against the superiors. The
superiors will respond to big money judgments, because the superiors
have the responsibility for protecting their budgets. ' 215 It would indeed
211. See, e.g., Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S.
564 (1959); Berberian v. Gibney, 514 F.2d 790 (1st Cir. 1975); Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972); Scherer v. Brennan, 379 F.2d 609 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1021 (1967).
212. S. REP. No. 469, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1973).
213. See text accompanying notes 22-23 supra.
-214. This is the approach taken under California law, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 825.6
(West Supp. 1976). There is currently no right of subrogation under the FTCA.
United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954). See generally B. SCHWARTZ, ADMIN-
ITwAfxrVE LAw § 201 (1976).
215. Letter from Kenneth Culp Davis to Robert Sloan, Committee on Government
Operation, Nov. 26, 1973, copy on file in the University of North Carolina Law Library.
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seem helpful in curbing abuses in the future if the agencies themselves
were required to have charged against their operating budgets judg-
ments against the United States that were due to the fraudulent, corrupt,
or malicious actions of their employees." 6
A fourth reform of the present law that should be considered is
the inclusion within the FTCA of those torts that are still exempt from
coverage under the amendment. This extension would reach certain
torts that seem almost accidentally to have been excluded from the
Act,217 as well as others, such as libel and slander, that may be neces-
sary to keep other equally egregious activities of government officials
from going unchallenged.21 8
VII. CONCLUSION
In a statement made to the Senate Government Operations Com-
mittee, Senator Sam Ervin recognized that the amendment was only "a
minimal first step in providing a remedy against the federal government
for innocent victims of federal law enforcement abuses." '' r While the
step was a big one, there are clearly others to take. The amendment
provides a useful means for obtaining financial compensation in the
wake of certain grievous abuses by law enforcement officials, but Con-
gress should not be led by this action to believe that it has dealt with the
216. While it may be difficult to plan an agency budget with contingencies like tortjudgments unaccounted for, it would seem desirable to set up a method of calculating
payments made because of tortious activity in prior years against an operating budget
in future years.
217. Negligent misrepresentation, for example, has been held not to permit recovery
under the FTCA. United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696 (1961); Fitch v. United
States, 513 F.2d 1013 (6th Cir. 1975). Even if Congress were to determine that such
an exception were necessary, it should modify or clarify the exception to make it clear
that recovery remains proper for negligent acts and deeds by federal officials that have
a verbal aspect. Compare DeLange v. United States, 372 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1967),
with Rey v. United States, 484 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1973).
The consequences, both personal and financial, of negligent misrepresentation or de-
liberate deceit are often tragic, and the need to "protect" the government in all such
activities is questionable. See generally Davis, Sovereign Immunity Must Go, 22 AD.
L. REv. 383 (1970); Note, Federal Compensation for Victims of the "Homeownershipfor the Poor" Program, 84 YALE LJ. 294 (1974).
218. The discovery by the Church Committee of FBI dirty tricks, such as mailing
letters to employers with false information about so-called subversive employees in ef-
forts to discredit them, would seem to make plain the need for libel and slander recovery.
See Mondale Letter, supra note 148, enclosure 1. Moreover, the inclusion of these torts
within the FTCA at this stage need not necessarily work a dramatic change in federal
liability. In the years since 1946 the common law rules of absolute liability have given
way to recoveries limited to situations of malice and aggravated intent, exactly those sit-
uations that the FTCA should reach.
219. S. REP. No. 588, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1973).
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inequities of sovereign immunity, and the question of a citizen's right to
redress for constitutional wrongs, in any final or comprehensive way.
The time is ripe broadly to reassess government liability for the tortious
and unconstitutional conduct of its officials;"' it should not pass with-
out the much-needed and long-sought reforms outlined in this article.
220. Recently, Attorney General Levi has announced he will order the FBI to notify
individuals who for 17 years were unwitting targets of COINTELPRO. This mass notifi-
cation program will involve thousands of individuals, and could bring forth a "barrage
of civil lawsuits." Raleigh News & Observer, March 31, 1976, at 1, cols. 2-5.

